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Abstract
We use decision theory to confront uncertainty that is su¢ ciently broad to incorporate
models as approximations.We presume the existence of a featured collection of what we
call structured modelsthat have explicit substantive motivations. The decision maker
confronts uncertainty through the lens of these models, but also views these models as
simplications, and hence, as misspecied. We extend min-max analysis under model
ambiguity to incorporate the uncertainty induced by acknowledging that the models used
in decision-making are simplied approximations. Formally, we provide an axiomatic
rationale for a decision criterion that incorporates model misspecication concerns.
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Come laraba fenice:
che vi sia, ciascun lo dice;
dove sia, nessun lo sa.1
1 Introduction
The consequences of a decision may depend on exogenous contingencies and uncertain out-
comes that are outside the control of a decision maker. This uncertainty takes on many forms.
Economic applications typically feature risk, where the decision maker knows probabilities
but not necessarily outcomes. Statisticians and econometricians have long wrestled with how
to confront ambiguity over models or unknown parameters within a model. Each model is
itself a simplication or an approximation designed to guide or enhance our understanding
of some underlying phenomenon of interest. Thus, the model, by its very nature, is mis-
specied, but in typically uncertain ways. How should a decision maker acknowledge model
misspecication in a way that guides the use of purposefully simplied models sensibly? This
concern has certainly been on the radar screen of statisticians and control theorists, but it
has been largely absent in formal approaches to decision theory.2 Indeed, the statisticians
Box and Cox have both stated the challenge succinctly in complementary ways:
Since all models are wrong, the scientist must be alert to what is importantly
wrong. It is inappropriate to be concerned about mice when there are tigers
abroad. Box (1976).
... it does not seem helpful just to say that all models are wrong. The very
word model implies simplication and idealization. The idea that complex
physical, biological or sociological systems can be exactly described by a few
formulae is patently absurd. The construction of idealized representations that
capture important stable aspects of such systems is, however, a vital part of
general scientic analysis and statistical models, especially substantive ones ...
Cox (1995).
While there are formulations of decision and control problems that intend to confront model
misspecication, the aim of this paper is: (i) to develop an axiomatic approach that will
provide a rigorous guide for applications and (ii) to enrich formal decision theory when
applied to environments with uncertainty through the guise of models.
1Like the Arabian phoenix: that it exists, everyone says; where it is, nobody knows.A passage from a
libretto of Pietro Metastasio.
2 In Hansen (2014) and Hansen and Marinacci (2016) three kinds of uncertainty are distinguished based on
the knowledge of the decision maker, the most challenging being model misspecication viewed as uncertainty
induced by the approximate nature of the models under consideration.
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In this paper, we explore formally decision making with multiple models, each of which
is allowed to be misspecied. We follow Hansen and Sargent (2020) by referring to these
multiple models as structured models.These structured models are ones that are explicitly
motivated or featured, such as ones with substantive motivation or scientic underpinnings,
consistent with the use of the term models by Box and Cox. They may be based on
scientic knowledge relying on empirical evidence and theoretical arguments or on reveal-
ing parameterizations of probability models with parameters that are interpretable to the
decision maker. In posing decision problems formally, it is often assumed, following Wald
(1950), that the correct model belongs to the set of models that decision makers posit. The
presumption that a decision maker identies, among their hypotheses, the correct model
is often questionable recalling the initial quotation, the correct model is often a decision
maker phoenix. We embrace, rather than push aside, the models are approximationsper-
spective of many applied researchers, as articulated by Box, Cox and others. To explore
misspecication formally, we introduce a potentially rich collection of probability distribu-
tions that depict possible representations of the data without formal substantive motivation.
We refer to these as unstructured models.We use such alternative models as a way to
capture how models could be misspecied.3
This distinction between structured and unstructured is central to the analysis in this
paper and is used to distinguish aversion to ambiguity over models and aversion to potential
model misspecication. At a decision-theoretic level, a proper analysis of misspecication
concerns has remained elusive so far. Indeed, some of the few studies dealing with economic
agents confronting model misspecication still assume that they are conventional expected
utility decision makers who treat model misspecication as if it were model ambiguity, despite
being aware of a misspecication issue.4 We extend the analysis of Hansen and Sargent (2020)
by providing an axiomatic underpinning for a corresponding decision theory along with a
representation of the implied preferences that can guide applications. In so doing, we show
an important connection with the analysis of subjective and objective rationality of Gilboa
et al. (2010).
Criterion This paper proposes a rst decision-theoretic analysis of decision making under
model misspecication. We consider a classic setup in the spirit of Wald (1950), but relative
to his seminal work we explicitly remove the assumption that the correct model belongs to
the set of posited models and we allow for nonneutrality toward this feature. More formally,
we assume that decision makers posit a set Q of structured (probabilistic) models q on
states, motivated by their information, but they are afraid that none of them is correct and
so face model misspecication. For this reason, decision makers contemplate what we call
3Such a distinction is also present in earlier work by Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Hansen and Miao
(2018) but without specic reference to the terms structuredand unstructured.
4See, e.g., Esponda and Pouzo (2016) and Fudenberg et al. (2017).
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unstructured models in ranking acts f , according to a conservative decision criterion5
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(1)
To interpret this problem, let
cQ (p) = min
q2Q
c (p; q)
where we presume that cQ(q) = 0 when q 2 Q. In this construction, cQ (p) is a (Hausdor¤)
distance between a model p and the posited compact set Q of structured models. This
distance is nonzero if and only if p is unstructured, that is, p =2 Q. More generally, ps that
are closer to the set of structured models Q have a less adverse impact on the preferences,
as evident by rewriting (1) as:
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ cQ (p)

This representation is a special case of the variational representation axiomatized by Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006). The unstructured models are statistical artifacts that allow the decision
maker to assess formally the potential consequences of misspecication as captured by the
construction of cQ. In this paper we provide a formal interpretation of cQ as an index of
misspecication fear: the lower the index, the higher the fear.6
A protective belt When c takes the entropic form R(pjjq), with  > 0, criterion (1)
takes the form
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R(pjjq)

(2)
proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2020). It is the most tractable version of criterion (1),
which for a singleton Q further reduces to a standard multiplier criterion a la Hansen and
Sargent (2001, 2008). By exchanging orders of minimization, we preserve this tractability
and provide a revealing link to this earlier research,
min
q2Q

min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ R(pjjq)

(3)
The inner minimization problem gives rise to the minimization problem featured by Hansen
and Sargent (2001, 2008) to confront the potential misspecication of a given probability
model q.7 Unstructured models lack the substantive motivation of structured models, yet
in (1) they act as a protective belt against model misspecication. The importance of
5Throughout the paper  denotes the set of all probabilities (Section 2.1).
6To ease terminology, we often refer to misspecicationrather than model misspecication.
7The Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) formulation of preferences builds on extensive literature in control
theory starting with Jacobson (1973)s deterministic robustness criterion and a stochastic extension given by
Petersen et al. (2000), among several others.
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their role is proportional (as quantied by ) to their proximity to the set Q, a measure of
their plausibility in view of the decision maker information. The outer minimization over
structured models is the counterpart to the Wald (1950) and the more general Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) max-min criterion.
Our analysis provides a decision-theoretic underpinning for incorporating misspecication
concerns in a distinct way from ambiguity aversion. Observe that misspecication fear is
absent when the index minq2Q c (p; q) equals the indicator function Q of the set of structured
models Q, that is,
min
q2Q
c (p; q) =
(
0 if p 2 Q
+1 else
In this case, which corresponds to  = +1 in (2), criterion (1) takes a max-min form:
V (f) = min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq (4)
This max-min criterion thus characterizes decision makers who confront model misspeci-
cation but are not concerned by it, so are misspecication neutral (see Section 4.1). The
criterion in (1) may thus be viewed as representing decision makers who use a more pruden-
tial variational criterion (1) than if they were to max-minimize over the set of structured
models which they posited. In particular, the farther away an unstructured model is from
the set Q (so the less plausible it is), the less it is weighted in the minimization.
Axiomatics We use the entropic case (2) to outline our axiomatic approach. Start with
a singleton Q = fqg. Decision makers, being afraid that the reference model q might not
be correct, contemplate also unstructured models p 2  and rank acts f according to the
multiplier criterion
V;q (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ R(pjjq)

(5)
Here the positive scalar  is interpreted as an index of misspecication fear. When decision
makers posit a nonsingleton set Q of structured models, but are concerned that none of them
is correct, then the multiplier criterion (5) gives only an incomplete dominance relation:
f % g () V;q (f)  V;q (g) 8q 2 Q (6)
With (6), decision makers can safely regard f better than g. This type of ranking has,
however, little traction because of the incomplete nature of %. Nonetheless, the burden
of choice will have decision makers to select between alternatives, be they rankable by %
or not. A cautious way to complete the binary relation % is given by the preference %
represented by (2), or equivalently by (3), that is,
V;Q (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R(pjjq)

(7)
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This criterion thus emerges in our analysis as a cautious completion of a multiplier dominance
relation %. Suitably extended to a general preference pair (%;%), this approach permits
to axiomatize criterion (1) as the representation of the behavioral preference % and the
unanimity criterion
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
as the representation of the incomplete dominance relation %.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Mathematics
Basic notions We consider a non-trivial event -algebra  of subsets of a state space S.
We denote by B0 () the space of -measurable simple functions ' : S ! R, endowed with
the supnorm k k1. The dual of B0 () can be identied with the space ba () of all bounded
nitely additive measures on (S;).
We denote by  the set of probabilities in ba () and endow  and any of its subsets
with the weak* topology. Moreover,  denotes the subset of  formed by the countably
additive probability measures. Given a subset Q in , we denote by (Q) the collection
of all probabilities p which are absolutely continuous with respect to Q, that is, if A 2 
and q (A) = 0 for all q 2 Q, then p (A) = 0. Moreover,  (q) denotes the set of elements
of  which are absolutely continuous with respect to a single q 2 , i.e.,  (q) =
fp 2  : p qg. Unless otherwise specied, throughout all the subsets of  are to be
intended non-empty.
The (convex analysis) indicator function C :  ! [0;1] of a convex subset C of  is
dened by
C (p) =
(
0 if p 2 C
+1 else
Throughout we adopt the convention 0  1 = 0.
The e¤ective domain of f : C ! ( 1;1], denoted by dom f , is the set fp 2 C : f (p) <1g
where f takes on a nite value. The function f is:
(i) grounded if the inmum of its image is 0, i.e., infp2C f (p) = 0;
(ii) strictly convex if, given any distinct p; q 2 C, we have f (p+ (1  ) q) < f (p) +
(1  ) f (q) for all  2 (0; 1) such that p+ (1  ) q 2 dom f .
Divergences and statistical distances Given a non-empty subset Q of , a function
c : Q! [0;1] is a divergence (for the set Q) if
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(i) the sections cq :  ! [0;1] are grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex for each
q 2 Q;
(ii) the function cQ :  ! [0;1] dened by cQ () = minq2Q c (; q) is well dened,
grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex;
(iii) c 1Q (0) = Q, that is, cQ (p) = 0 if and only if p 2 Q.
A divergence c that satises the distance property
c (p; q) = 0() p = q (8)
is called statistical distance (for the set Q).8 In particular, cQ (p) is now an Hausdor¤
statistical distance between p and Q.
The next lemma provides a simple condition for a function c :   Q ! [0;1] to be a
statistical distance.
Lemma 1 Let Q be a compact and convex subset of . A jointly lower semicontinuous and
convex function c :   Q ! [0;1] is a statistical distance if and only if it satises the
distance property (8).
Given a strictly convex continuous function  : [0;1) ! [0;1) such that  (1) = 0 and
limt!1  (t) =t =1, dene a -divergence D :  ! [0;1] by
D (pjjq) =
8<:
R


dp
dq

dq if p 2  (q)
1 otherwise
Here we adopt the conventions 0=0 = 0 and ln 0 =  1.9 The most important example of
a divergence is the relative entropy given by  (t) = t ln t  t+ 1 and denoted by R (pjjq).10
Another important example is the Gini relative index given by the quadratic function  (t) =
(t  1)2 =2 and denoted by 2 (pjjq).
A -divergence D :  ! [0;1] is jointly convex and lower semicontinuous.11 Next
we show that, when suitably restricted, it is a statistical distance, an important property for
our purposes.
Lemma 2 Let Q be a compact and convex subset of . A restricted -divergence D :
Q! [0;1] is a statistical distance.
8By a statistical distance we do not restrict ourselves to a metric and in particular, given p; q 2 Q,
c (p; q) is not necessarily equal to c (q; p).
9The function dp=dq is any version of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of p with respect to q.
10Given the conventions 0=0 = 0  1 = 0, it holds  (0) = 0 ln 0  0 + 1 = 0   1+ 1 = 1.
11See Chapter 1 of Liese and Vajda (1987). We refer to this book for properties of -divergences.
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A -divergence is an instance of a (universal) statistical distance c :    ! [0;1]
whose restriction to each compact and convex subset Q of  is a statistical distance for Q.
Finally, given a coe¢ cient  2 (0;1], the function
D : Q! [0;1]
is also a statistical distance. Indeed, when  =1 we have
(1)D (pjjq) = fqg (p) =
(
0 if p = q
1 else
because of the convention 0  1 = 0.
2.2 Decision Theory
Setup We consider a generalized Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setup where a decision
maker chooses among uncertain alternatives described by (simple) acts f : S ! X, which
are -measurable simple (i.e., nite valued) functions from a state space S to a consequence
space X. This latter set is assumed to be a non-empty convex subset of a vector space (for
instance, X is the set of all simple lotteries dened on a prize space). The triple
(S;; X) (9)
forms an (Anscombe-Aumann) decision framework.
Let us denote by F the set of all acts. Given any consequence x 2 X, we denote by
x 2 F also the constant act that takes value x. Thus, with a standard abuse of notation, we
identify X with the subset of constant acts in F . Given a function u : X ! R, we denote
by Imu its image. Observe that u  f 2 B0 () when f 2 F .
A preference % is a binary relation on F that satises the so-called basic conditions (cf.
Gilboa et al., 2010), i.e., it is:
(i) reexive and transitive;
(ii) monotone: if f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S, then f % g for all f; g 2 F ;
(iii) continuous: the sets f 2 [0; 1] : f + (1  ) g % hg and f 2 [0; 1] : h % f + (1  ) gg
are closed for all f; g; h 2 F ;
(iv) non-trivial : there exist f; g 2 F such that f  g.
Moreover, a preference % is unbounded if, for each x; y 2 X with x  y, there exist
z; z0 2 X such that
1
2
z +
1
2
y % x  y % 1
2
x+
1
2
z0
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Bets are binary acts that play a key role in decision theory. Formally, given any two prizes
x  y, a bet on an event A is the act xAy dened by
xAy (s) =
(
x if s 2 A
y else
In words, a bet on event A is a binary act that yields a more preferred consequence if A
obtains.
Comparative uncertainty aversion As in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), given two
preferences %1 and %2 on F , we say that %1 is more uncertainty averse than %2 if, for each
consequence x 2 X and act f 2 F ,
f %1 x =) f %2 x
In words, a preference is more uncertainty averse than another one if, whenever this prefer-
ence is bold enoughto prefer an uncertain alternative over a sure one, so does the other
one.
Decision criteria A complete preference % on F is variational if it is represented by a
decision criterion V : F ! R given by
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p)

(10)
where the utility function u is non-constant and the index of uncertainty aversion c :  !
[0;1] is grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex. In particular, given two unbounded
variational preferences %1 and %2 on F that share the same u, but di¤erent indexes c1 and
c2, we have that %1 is more uncertainty averse than %2 if and only if c1  c2 (see Maccheroni
et al., 2006, Proposition 8).
When the function c has the entropic form c (p; q) = R (pjjq) with respect to a reference
probability q 2 , criterion (10) takes the multiplier form
V;q (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ R(pjjq)

analyzed by Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008).12 If, instead, the function c has the indicator
form C , with C compact and convex, criterion (10) takes the max-min form
V (f) = min
p2C
Z
u (f) dp
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
All these criteria are here considered in their classical interpretation, so Waldean for the
max-min criterion, in which the elements of  are interpreted as models.
12Strzalecki (2011) provides the behavioral assumptions that characterize multiplier preferences among
variational preferences.
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3 Models and preferences
3.1 Models
The consequences of the acts among which decision makers have to choose depend on ex-
ogenous states that are outside their control. They know that states obtain according to
a probabilistic model described by a probability measure in , the so-called true or cor-
rect model. If decision makers knew the true model, they would confront only risk, which
is the randomness inherent to the probabilistic nature of the model. Our decision makers,
unfortunately, may not know the true model. Yet, they are able to posit a set of structured
probabilistic models Q, based on their information (which might well include existing scien-
tic theories, say economic or physical), that form a set of alternative hypotheses regarding
the true model. It is a classical assumption, in the spirit of Wald (1950), in which Q is a set
of posited hypotheses about the probabilistic behavior of a, natural or social, phenomenon
of interest.
A classical decision framework is described by a quartet:
(S;; X;Q) (11)
in which a set Q of models is added to a standard decision framework (9). The true model
might not be in Q, that is, the decision makers information may be unable to pin it down.
Throughout the paper we assume that decision makers know this limitation of their informa-
tion and so confront model misspecication.13 This is in contrast with Wald (1950) and most
of the subsequent decision-theoretic literature, which assumes that decision makers either
know the true model and so face risk or, at least, know that the true model belongs to Q
and so face model ambiguity.14
In what follows we assume that Q is a compact and convex subset of . As usual, con-
vexity signicantly simplies the analysis. Yet, conceptually it is not an innocuous property:
a hybrid model that mixes two structured models can only have a less motivation than ei-
ther of them. Decision criterion (1), however, accounts for the lower appeal of hybrid models
when c (p; q) is convex in q (as, for instance, when c is a -divergence). To see why, observe
that minp2
R
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)
	
is, for each act f , convex in q. In turn, this implies that
hybrid models negatively a¤ect criterion criterion (1). This negative impact of mixing thus
features an aversion to model hybridizationattitude, behaviorally captured by axiom A.7.
Remarkably, (2) the relative entropy criterion turns out to be neutral to model hybridization.
In this important special case, the assumption of convexity of Q is actually without any loss
of generality (as Appendix A.1.3 claries).
13Aydogan et al. (2018) propose an experimental setting that reveals the relevance of model misspecication
for decision making.
14The model ambiguity (or uncertainty) literature is reviewed in Marinacci (2015).
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Convexity of Q can be also justied in a robust Bayesian interpretation of our analysis
that regards Q as the set of the so-called predictive distributions, which are combinations of
primitivemodels (typically extreme points of Q) weighted according to alternative priors
over them. For instance, if the primitive models describe states through i.i.d. processes, the
elements of Q describe them via exchangeable processes that combine primitive models and
priors (as in the Hewitt and Savage, 1955, version of the de Finetti Representation Theorem).
Under this interpretation, the ps are introduced to provide a protective shield for each of
the predictive distributions constructed from the alternative priors that are considered.
3.2 Preferences
We consider a two-preference setup, as in Gilboa et al. (2010), with a mental preference %
and a behavioral preference %.
Denition 1 A preference % is ( subjectively) rational if it is:
a. complete;
b. risk independent: if x; y; z 2 X and  2 (0; 1), then x  y implies x + (1  ) z 
y + (1  ) z.
The behavioral preference % governs the decision maker choice behavior and so it is
natural to require it to be complete because, eventually, the decision maker has to choose
between alternatives (burden of choice). It is subjectively rational because, in an argu-
mentative perspective, the decision maker cannot be convinced that it leads to incorrect
choices. Risk independence ensures that % is represented on the space of consequences X
by an a¢ ne utility function u : X ! R, for instance an expected utility functional when X
is the set of simple lotteries. So, risk is addressed in a standard way and we abstract from
non-expected utility issues.
The mental preference % on F represents the decision maker genuinepreference over
acts, so it has the nature of a dominance relation for the decision maker. As such, it might
well not be complete because of the decision maker inability to compare some pairs of acts.
Denition 2 A preference % is a dominance relation (or is objectively rational) if it is:
a. c-complete: if x; y 2 X, then x % y or y % x;
b. weak c-independent: if f; g 2 F , x; y 2 X and
 2 (0; 1) ; f + (1  )x % g + (1  )x =) f + (1  )y % g + (1  )y
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c. convex: if f; g; h 2 F and  2 (0; 1),
f % h and g % h =) f + (1  ) g % h
If f % g we say that f dominates g (strictly if f  g). The dominance relation is,
axiomatically, a variational preference which is not required to be complete.15 It is objectively
rational because the decision maker can convince others of its reasonableness, for instance
through arguments based on scientic theories (a case especially relevant for our purposes).
Momentarily, axiom A.3 will further clarify its nature.
Along with the classical decision framework (11), the preferences % and % form a two-
preference classical decision environment
(S;; X;Q;%;%) (12)
The next two assumptions, which we take from Gilboa et al. (2010), connect the two
preferences % and %.
A.1 Consistency. For all f; g 2 F ,
f % g =) f % g
Consistency asserts that, whenever possible, the mental ranking informs the behavioral one.
The next condition says that the decision maker opts, by default, for a sure alternative x
over an uncertain one f , unless the dominance relation says otherwise.
A.2 Caution. For all x 2 X and all f 2 F ,
f 6% x =) x % f
Unlike the previous assumptions, the next two are peculiar to our analysis. They both
link Q to the two preferences % and % of the decision maker. We begin with the dominance
relation %. Here we write f Q= g when q (f = g) = 1 for all q 2 Q, i.e., f and g are equal
almost everywhere according to each structured model.
A.3 Objective Q-coherence. For all f; g 2 F ,
f
Q
= g =) f  g
and % is complete when Q is a singleton
15Convexity is stronger than uncertainty aversion a la Schmeidler (1989), which merely requires that f  g
implies f + (1  ) g % g. Yet, under completeness of % convexity and uncertainty aversion coincide (see,
e.g., Lemma 56 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011).
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This axiom rst provides a preferential translation of the special status of structured models
over unstructured ones: if they all regard two acts to be almost surely identical, the decision
maker genuinepreference % follows suit and ranks them indi¤erent.
The axiom also disciplines the incompleteness of % by requiring that model ambiguity,
i.e., a nonsingleton Q, is what underlies it. When Q is a singleton, the two preferences
% and % agree and yet, because of model misspecication, satisfy only a weak form of
independence. In other words, in our approach model misspecication may cause violations
of the independence axiom for the dominance relation. Later in the paper, Section 4.2 will
further discuss this important feature of our analysis.
To introduce the second assumption, recall that a rational preference % admits an a¢ ne
utility function u : X ! R because it satises risk independence. This permits to dene,
given a model p 2 , a consequence xpf 2 X for each act f via the equality
u(xpf ) =
Z
u (f) dp
We can interpret xpf as the certainty equivalent of act f if p were the correct model. This no-
tion of certainty equivalent permits to relate the posited set of models Q with the behavioral
preference %, here assumed to be rational.
A.4 Subjective Q-coherence. For all f 2 F and all x 2 X, we have
x  xpf =) x  f
if and only if p 2 Q.
In words, p 2  is a structured model, so belongs to Q, if and only if decision makers take
it seriously, that is, they never choose an act f that would be strictly dominated if p were
the correct model. Such a salience of p for the decision makers preference is the preferential
footprint of a structured model, which decision makers take seriously under consideration
because of its informational, possibly scientic, status (as opposed to an unstructured model,
which decision makers regard as a statistical artifact).
4 Representation with given structured information
We now show how the assumptions on the mental and behavioral preferences permit to
characterize criterion (1) for a given set Q, that is, for a DMs given structured information.
To this end, we say that a divergence c :  Q ! [0;1] is uniquely null if, for all (p; q) 2
Q, the sets c 1p (0) and c 1q (0) are at most singletons. For instance, statistical distances
are easily seen to be uniquely null because of the distance property (8).
We are now ready to state our rst representation result.
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Theorem 1 Let (S;; X;Q;%;%) be a two-preference classical decision environment, where
(S;) is a standard Borel space. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) % is an unbounded dominance relation and % is a rational preference that are both
Q-coherent and jointly satisfy consistency and caution;
(ii) there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a divergence c :   Q ! [0;1],
with dom cQ  (Q), such that, for all acts f; g 2 F ,
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
(13)
and
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(14)
If, in addition, c is uniquely null, then c :   Q ! [0;1] can be chosen to be a statistical
distance.
This result identies, in particular, the main preferential assumptions underlying a rep-
resentation of the type
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(15)
for the preference %. While this representation is of interest for a general divergence with
respect to a set Q, it is of particular interest when c : Q! [0;1] is a statistical distance.
In this case, the partial ordering % is more easily interpreted. Though a technical condition
of unique nullityis imposed to pin down statistical distances, our representation arguably
has more general applicability and captures the preferential underpinning of criterion (15).
The Hausdor¤ statistical distance minq2Q c (p; q) between p and Q is strictly positive if
and only if p is an unstructured model, i.e., p =2 Q. In particular, the more distant from Q
is an unstructured model, the more it is penalized as reected in the minimization problem
that criterion (15) features.
A misspecication index A behavioral preference % represented by (15) is variational
with index minq2Q c (p; q). So, if two unbounded preferences %1 and %2 represented by (15)
share the same u but feature di¤erent statistical distancesminq2Q c1 (p; q) andminq2Q c2 (p; q),
then %1 is more uncertainty averse than %2 if and only if
min
q2Q
c1 (p; q)  min
q2Q
c2 (p; q)
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In the present classicalsetting we interpret this comparative result as saying that the lower
is minq2Q c (p; q), the higher is the fear of misspecication. We thus regard the function
p 7! min
q2Q
c (p; q) (16)
as an index of aversion to model misspecication and we call it, for short, a misspecication
index. The lower is this index, the higher is the fear of misspecication.
Specications and computability Two specications of our representation are notewor-
thy. First, when c is the entropic statistical distance R(pjjq), with  2 (0;1], we have the
following important special case of our representation
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R(pjjq)

(17)
which gives tractability to our decision criterion under model misspecication. Specically,
for  2 (0;1),16
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R(pjjq)

= min
q2Q
  log
Z
e 
u(f):
 dq (18)
This result is well known when Q is a singleton, that is, when (17) is a standard multiplier
criterion.17
A second noteworthy special case of our representation is the Gini criterion
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
2(pjjq)

:
Remarkably, we have
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
2(pjjq)

= min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq   1
2
Varq (u (f))

for all acts f for which the max-min mean-variance (in utils) criterion on the r.h.s. is
monotone. So, the Gini criterion is a monotone version of the max-min mean-variance
criterion.
As to computability, in the important case when criterion (1) features a -divergence,
like the specications just discussed, we need only to know the set Q to compute it, no
integral with respect to unstructured models is needed. This is proved in the next result, a
consequence of a duality formula of Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007).18
16When  =1, we have minp2
R
u (f) dp+ minq2QR(pjjq)
	
= minq2Q
R
u (f) dq.
17See Appendix A.1.3 for the simple proof of (18).
18Here  denotes the Fenchel conjugate of .
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Proposition 1 Given Q   and  > 0, for each act f 2 F it holds
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
D(pjjq)

=  inf
q2Q
sup
2R

  
Z


   u (f)


dq

for all u : X ! R.
The r.h.s. formula computes criterion (1) for -divergences by using only integrals with
respect to structured models. This formula substantially simplies computations and thus
conrms the analytical tractability of the previous specications.
4.1 Interpretation of the decision criterion
In the Introduction we outlined a protective beltinterpretation of decision criterion (15),
i.e.,
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

To elaborate, we begin by observing that the misspecication index (16) has the following
bounds
0  min
q2Q
c (p; q)  Q (p) 8p 2  (19)
where Q is the indicator function of the set Q of structured models. So, fear of misspeci-
cation is absent when the misspecication index is Q e.g., when  = +1 in (17)  in
which case criterion (15) takes a Wald (1950) max-min form
V (f) = min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq (20)
This max-min criterion characterizes a decision maker who confronts model misspeci-
cation but is not concerned by it. In other words, this Waldean decision maker is a natural
candidate to be (model) misspecication neutral. The next limit result further corroborates
this insight by showing that, when the fear of misspecication vanishes, the decision maker
becomes Waldean.19
Proposition 2 For each act f 2 F , we have
lim
"1
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R (pjjq)

= min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq
These observations, via bounds and limits, call for a proper decision-theoretic analysis of
misspecication neutrality. To this end, note that structured models may be incorrect, yet
useful as Box (1976) famously remarked. This motivates the next notion. Recall that act
xAy, with x  y, represents a bet on event A.
19To ease matters, we state the result in terms of criterion (17). A general version can be easily established
via an increasing sequence of misspecication indexes, with cnQ  cn+1Q for each n and lim cnQ (p) =1 for each
p 62 Q. For example, cnQ (p) = nminq2QD (pjjq) where n " 1.
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Denition 3 A preference % is bet-consistent if, given any x  y,
q (A)  q (B) 8q 2 Q =) xAy % xBy
for all events A;B 2 .
Under bet-consistency, a decision maker may fear model misspecication yet regards
structured models as good enough to choose to bet on events that they unanimously rank
as more likely. Preferences that are bet-consistent can be classied as exhibiting a relatively
mild form of fear of model misspecication. The following result shows that an important
class of preferences, which includes the ones represented by criterion (17), are bet-consistent.
Proposition 3 If  2 (0;1) and c = D, then a preference % represented by (15) is
bet-consistent.
Next we substantially strengthen bet-consistency by considering all acts, not just bets.
Denition 4 A rational preference % on F is (model) misspecication neutral ifZ
u (f) dq 
Z
u (g) dq 8q 2 Q =) f % g
for all acts f; g 2 F .
In this case, a decision maker trusts models enough so to follow them when, if correct,
they would unanimously rank pairs of acts. Fear of misspecication thus plays no role in
the decision maker preference, so it is decision-theoretically irrelevant. For this reason, the
decision maker attitude toward model misspecication can be classied as neutral. The next
result shows that this may happen if and only if the decision maker adopts the max-min
criterion (20).
Proposition 4 A preference % represented by criterion (15) is misspecication neutral if
and only if it is represented by the max-min criterion (20).
This result provides the sought-after decision-theoretic argument for the interpretation of
the max-min criterion as the special case of decision criterion (15) that corresponds to aver-
sion to model ambiguity, with no fear of misspecication. As remarked in the Introduction,
it suggests that a decision maker using such a criterion may be viewed as a decision maker
who, under model ambiguity, would max-minimize over the set of structured models which he
posited but that, for fear of misspecication, ends up using the more prudential variational
criterion (15). Unstructured models lack the informational status of structured models, yet
in the criterion (15) they act as a protective beltagainst model misspecication.
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Note that under this interpretation of criterion (15), the special multiplier case of a sin-
gleton Q = fqg corresponds to a decision maker who, with no fear of misspecication, would
adopt the expected utility criterion
R
u (f) dq. In other words, a singleton Q corresponds to
an expected utility decision maker who fears misspecication.
Summing up, in our analysis decision makers adopt the max-min criterion (20) if they
either confront only model ambiguity (an information trait) or are averse to model ambiguity
(a taste trait) with no fear of model misspecication.
4.2 Interpretation of the dominance relation
As just argued, the singleton Q = fqg special case
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

(21)
of decision criterion (15) is an expected utility criterion under fear of misspecication (of the
unique posited q). Via the relation
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q (22)
the representation theorem thus claries the interpretation of % as a dominance relation
under model misspecication by showing that it amounts to uniform dominance across all
structured models with respect to criterion (21).
It is easy to see that strict dominance amounts to (22), with strict inequality for some
q 2 Q. This observation raises a question: is there a notion of dominance that corresponds
to strict inequality for all q 2 Q? To address this question, we introduce a strong dominance
relation by writing f  g if, for all acts h; l 2 F ,
(1  ) f + h  (1  ) g + l
for all small enough  2 [0; 1].20 By taking h = f and l = g, we have the basic implication
f  g =) f  g
Strong dominance is a strengthening of strict dominance in which the decision maker can
convince others beyond reasonable doubt. The next characterization corroborates this
interpretation and, at the same time, answers the previous question in the positive.21
Proposition 5 Let c :   Q ! [0;1] be a divergence, u : X ! R an onto and a¢ ne
function and % an unbounded dominance relation represented by (22). For all acts f; g 2 F ,
we have f  g if and only if there exists " > 0 such that
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

+ " 8q 2 Q
20Strong dominance has been introduced by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2020).
21Up to an " that ensures a needed uniformity of the strict inequality across structured models.
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This characterization shows that  and  agree on consequences and, more impor-
tantly, that
f  g =) min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

> min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
In turn, this easily implies
f  g =) f  g (23)
We can diagram the relationships among the di¤erent dominance notions as follows:
 =)  6=) 
+ +
 =) %
An instance when
f  g =) f  g (24)
may fail is the max-min criterion (20).
We close by discussing misspecication neutrality, which in view of Proposition 4 is
characterized by the misspecication index minq2Q c (p; q) = Q (p).
Lemma 3 Let c be a statistical distance c : Q! [0;1]. We have minq2Q c (p; q) = Q (p)
if and only if, for each q 2 Q, c (p; q) =1 for all p =2 Q.
In words, misspecication neutrality is characterized by a statistical distance that max-
imally penalizes unstructured models, which end up playing no role. From a statistical
distance angle, this conrms that misspecication neutrality is the attitude of a decision
maker who confronts model misspecication, but does not care about it (and so has no use
for unstructured models).
This angle becomes relevant here because it shows that, under misspecication neutrality,
the representation (22) of the dominance relation becomes
f % g () min
q02Q
Z
u (f) dq0 + c
 
q0; q
  min
q02Q
Z
u (g) dq0 + c
 
q0; q
 8q 2 Q
Unstructured models play no role here. Next we show that also statistical distances play no
role, so representation (22) further reduces to
f % g ()
Z
u (f) dq 
Z
u (g) dq 8q 2 Q (25)
when the dominance relation satises the independence axiom. This means, inter alia, that
fear of model misspecication may cause violations of the independence axiom for such a
relation, thus providing a new rationale for violations of this classic axiom.
All this is shown by the next result, which is the version for our setting of the main result
of Gilboa et al. (2010).
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Proposition 6 Let (S;; X;Q;%;%) be a two-preference classical decision environment.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) % is an unbounded dominance relation that satises independence and % is a rational
preference that are both Q-coherent and jointly satisfy consistency and caution;
(ii) there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a statistical distance c :   Q !
[0;1], with c (p; q) = fqg (p) for all (p; q) 2 Q, such that (13) and (14) hold, i.e.,
f % g ()
Z
u (f) dq 
Z
u (g) dq 8q 2 Q
and
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp  min
p2
Z
u (g) dp
Under independence, the dominance relation % thus takes a misspecication neutral
form, while the preference % is represented by the max-min criterion.
5 Representation with varying structured information
So far, we carried out our analysis for a given set Q of structured models. Indeed, a two-
preference classical decision environment (12) should be more properly written as 
S;; X;Q;%Q;%Q

with the dependence of preferences on Q highlighted. Decision environments, however, may
share common state and consequence spaces, but di¤er on the posited sets of structured
models because of di¤erent information that decision makers may have. It then becomes
important to ensure that decision makers use decision criteria that, across such environments,
are consistent.
To address this issue, in this section we consider a family 
S;; X;Q;%Q;%Q
	
Q2Q
of classical decision environments that di¤er in the set Q of posited models and we introduce
axioms on the family
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
that connect these environments. In keeping with what
assumed so far, Q is the collection of compact and convex subsets of .
A.5 Monotonicity (in model ambiguity). If Q0  Q then, for all f; g 2 F ,
f %Q g =) f %Q0 g
19
According to this axiom, if the structuredinformation underlying a set Q is good enough
for the decision maker to establish that an act dominates another one, a better information
which decreases model ambiguity can only conrm such judgement. Its reversal would be,
indeed, at odds with the objective rationality spirit of the dominance relation.
Next we consider a separability assumption.
A.6 Q-separability : For all f; g 2 F ,
f %q g 8q 2 Q =) f %Q g
In words, an act dominates another one when it does, separately, through the lenses of
each structured model. In this axiom the incompleteness of %Q arises as that of a Paretian
order over the, complete but possibly misspecication averse, preferences %q determined by
the elements of Q.
These two assumptions, paired with the ones of Theorem 1, guarantee that all dominance
relations %Q agree on X. We can thus just write %, dropping the subscript Q. To state the
next axiom, we need a last piece of notation: we denote by xf;q the certainty equivalent of
act f for preference %q .
A.7 Model hybridization aversion. Given any q; q0 2 ,
xf;q + (1  )xf;q0 % xf;q+(1 )q0
for all  2 (0; 1) and all f 2 F .
According to this axiom, the decision maker dislike, ceteris paribus, facing a hybrid
structured model q+ (1  ) q0 that, by mixing two structured models q and q0, could only
have a less substantive motivation (cf. Section 3.1).
We close with a continuity axiom.
A.8 Lower semicontinuity. For all x 2 X and all f 2 F , the set fq 2  : x % xf;qg is
closed.
We can now state the extension of Theorem 1 to families of decision environments.
Theorem 2 Let  
S;; X;Q;%Q;%Q
	
Q2Q
be a family of two-preference classical decision environments. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i)
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is monotone, Q-separable, lower semicontinuous, averse to model hybridiza-
tion and, for each Q 2 Q, the preferences %Q and %Q satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem
1;
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(ii) there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a jointly lower semicontinuous and
convex statistical distance c :   ! [0;1], with dom cQ  (Q) for all Q 2 Q,
such that, for all acts f; g 2 F ,
f %Q g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
(26)
and
f %Q g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(27)
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation and, given u, c is unique.
This theorem ensures that the decision maker uses consistently criterion (1) across de-
cision environments. In particular, the same statistical distance function is used (e.g., the
relative entropy). Moreover, axioms A.5-A.7 further clarify the nature of structured models
and their connection with the dominance relation.
Besides its broader scope, this theorem improves Theorem 1 on two counts. First, it
features a statistical distance without the need of a unique nullity condition. Second, it
contains a sharp uniqueness part. The cost of these improvements is a less parsimonious
setting in which the set Q is permitted to vary across the collection Q of compact and
convex subsets of .
6 Admissibility
A two-preference classical decision problem is a septet 
F; S;; X;Q;%Q;%Q

(28)
where F  F is a non-empty choice set formed by the acts among which a decision maker
has actually to choose, %Q and %Q are preferences represented by (26) and (27).
Given a compact and convex set Q in , the decision maker chooses the best act in F
according to %Q. In particular, the value function v : Q ! ( 1;1] is given by
v (Q) = sup
f2F
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(29)
Yet, it is the dominance relation %Q that permits to introduce admissibility.
Denition 5 An act f 2 F is (weakly) admissible if there is no act g 2 F that (strongly)
strictly dominates f .
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To relate this notion to the usual notion of admissibility,22 observe that g Q f amounts
to
min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
with strict inequality for some q 2 Q. We are thus purposefully dening admissibility in
terms of the structured models Q, not the larger class of models , with a model-by-model
adjustment for misspecication that makes our notion di¤erent from the usual one.
The next result relates optimality and admissibility.
Proposition 7 Consider a decision problem (28).
(i) Optimal acts are weakly admissible. They are admissible provided (24) holds.
(ii) Unique optimal acts are admissible.
Optimal acts (if exist) might not be admissible because the max-min nature of decision
criterion (15) may lead to violations of (24). Yet, the last result ensures that they belong to
the collection of weakly admissible acts
F Q =

f 2 F : @g 2 F; g Q f
	
Next we build on this property to establish a comparative statics exercise across decision
problems (28) that di¤er on the posited set Q of structured models.
Proposition 8 We have
Q  Q0 =) v (Q)  v  Q0
and
v (Q) = max
f2F Q
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

provided the sup in (29) is achieved.
Smaller sets of structured models are, thus, more valuable. Indeed, in decision problems
that feature a larger set of structured models  so, a more discordant information  the
decision maker exhibits, ceteris paribus, a higher fear of misspecication:
Q  Q0 =) min
q2Q
c (p; q)  min
q2Q0
c (p; q)
In turn, this easily implies v (Q)  v (Q0).
The decision maker thus dislikes information discordance. In a nite state space,23 infor-
mation discordance is maximal, so information is inconclusive, when Q = . Indeed, by the
22See, e.g., Ferguson (1967) p. 54.
23 Innite state spaces require some technicalities.
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distance property (8) we have minq2Q c (p; q) = 0 for all p 2  if and only if Q = . So, the
simplex case represents maximal misspecication fear, given any c (so, any attitude toward
model misspecication). Criterion (15) then takes an extreme statewise max-minimization
form
V (f) = min
s2S
u (f (s))
which embodies a form of the precautionary principle that, here, thus emerges out of inconclu-
sive information (e.g., based on inconclusive scientic knowledge). In contrast, information
discordance is absent when Q is a singleton.
7 A divergence twist
In our analysis a notion of set divergence naturally arises. Specically, denoting by Q the
collection of all compact and convex subsets of , say that a function C : Q ! [0;1]
is a set divergence if
(i) C (; Q) : ! [0;1] is grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex for each Q 2 Q;
(ii) C (p;Q) = 0 if and only if p 2 Q.
If, for each Q 2 Q, we consider a lower semicontinuous and convex statistical distance
c :   Q ! [0;1], by Lemma 1 we can dene a set divergence by setting C (p;Q) =
minq2Q c (p; q). In particular, C (p; fqg) = c (p; q). This is the Hausdor¤-type set diver-
gence that characterizes our decision criterion (1). Yet, for a generic set divergence C, not
necessarily pinned down by an underlying statistical distance c, our criterion generalizes to
VQ (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ C (p;Q)

Since C (p;Q)  Q (p) for all p 2 , this variational criterion still represents a preference
that is more uncertainty averse than the max-min one (4). Though the analysis of this
general criterion is beyond the scope of this paper, this brief discussion should help to put
our exercise in a better perspective.
8 Conclusion
Quantitative researchers use models to enhance their understanding of economic phenomena
and to make policy assessments. In essence, each model tells its own quantitative story. We
refer to such models as structured models.Typically, there are more than just one such
type of model, with each giving rise to a di¤erent quantitative story. Statistical and eco-
nomic decision theories have addressed how best to confront the ambiguity among structured
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models. Such structured models are, by their very nature, misspecied. Nevertheless, the
decision maker seeks to use such models in sensible ways. This problem is well recognized by
applied researchers, but it is typically not part of formal decision theory. In this paper, we
extend decision theory to confront model misspecication concerns. In so doing, we recover
a variational representation of preferences that includes penalization based on discrepancy
measures between unstructured alternativesand the set of structured probability models.
A Proofs and related analysis
In the appendix, we provide the proofs of our main results plus some ancillary results.
Appendix A.1 contains all the results pertaining statistical -divergences and distances.
Appendix A.3 contains the proofs of our representation results (Theorems 1 and 2). Appendix
A.4 contains the proofs of the remaining results.
A.1 Preamble
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We substantially need to prove that the function cQ :  ! [0;1], dened by cQ (p) =
minq2Q c(p; q), is well dened, grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex. This fact follows
from the following version of a well known result (see, e.g., Fiacco and Kyparisis, 1986).
Lemma 4 Let Q be a compact and convex subset of . If c :   Q ! [0;1] is a jointly
lower semicontinuous and convex function such that there exist p 2  and q 2 Q such that
c (p; q) = 0, then cQ : ! [0;1] dened by
cQ (p) = min
q2Q
c (p; q) 8p 2 
is well dened, grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex.
Proof Since c is lower semicontinuous and Q is non-empty and compact, cQ is well dened.
Moreover, we have that 0  c (p; q)  cQ (p)  0, proving that cQ is grounded. We next
show that cQ is lower semicontinuous. Consider ~U = fp 2  : cQ (p) > g where  2 R. If
~U is empty, then it is open. Otherwise, consider p 2 ~U . It follows that
(p; q) 2  p0; q0 2 Q : c  p0; q0 > 	 = U 8q 2 Q
Since c is jointly lower semicontinuous, then U is open in the product topology. Thus, for
each q 2 Q there exist two neighborhoods Uq and Vq such that
(p; q) 2 Uq  Vq  U
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Since q 2 Vq for all q 2 Q, we have that fVqgq2Q is an open cover of Q. Since Q is compact,
it admits a nite subcover fVqigni=1. Dene the open set U = \ni=1Uqi . Since p 2 Uq for
all q 2 Q, note that p 2 U . Consider p 2 U and q0 2 Q. It follows that q0 2 Vqi for some
i 2 f1; :::; ng. This implies that (p; q0) 2 Uqi  Vqi  U . We can conclude that c (p; q0) > .
Since p and q0 were arbitrarily chosen in U and Q, we have that cQ (p) = minq02Q c (p; q0) > 
for all p 2 U , proving that p 2 U  ~U and so lower semicontinuity of cQ.
If p1; p2 2 , then dene q1; q2 2 Q to be such that
c (p1; q1) = min
q2Q
c (p1; q) = cQ (p1) and c (p2; q2) = min
q2Q
c (p2; q) = cQ (p2)
Consider  2 (0; 1). Dene p = p1 + (1  ) p2 and q = q1 + (1  ) q2 2 Q. Since c is
jointly convex, it follows that
cQ (p) = min
q2Q
c (p; q)  c (p; q)  c (p1; q1) + (1  ) c (p2; q2)
= cQ (p1) + (1  ) cQ (p2)
proving convexity. 
Proof of Lemma 1We rst prove the Ifpart. We need to prove that c is a divergence that
satises (8). In particular, we need to show that cQ and cq are well dened, grounded, lower
semicontinuous and convex for all q 2 Q. As for cq, since c is jointly lower semicontinuous
and convex, so is cq and we only need to prove that cq is grounded. Since c  0 satises (8),
we have that cq (q) = c (q; q) = 0, proving that cq  0 is grounded. By Lemma 4 and since
Q is non-empty, compact and convex and c is jointly lower semicontinuous and convex and
such that c (q; q) = 0 for all q 2 Q, then cQ :  ! [0;1] is well dened, grounded, lower
semicontinuous and convex. Finally, since c satises (8), note that cQ (p) = 0 if and only if
c (p; q) = 0 for some q 2 Q if and only if p = q for some q 2 Q if and only if p 2 Q.
As for the Only ifpart, it is trivial since a statistical distance function, by denition,
satises (8). 
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We actually prove a more complete result.24 A piece of notation: we write p  Q if there
exists a control measure q 2 Q such that p  q.25
24Though a routine result, for the sake of completeness, we provide a proof since we did not nd one
allowing S to be innite (see Topsoe, 2001, p. 178 for the nite case).
25A probability q 2 Q is a control measure of Q if q0  q for all q0 2 Q. When Q is a compact and convex
subset of , Q has a control measure (see, e.g., Maccheroni and Marinacci, 2001). Such a measure might
not be unique, yet any two control measures of Q are equivalent. So, the notion p  Q is well dened and
independent of the chosen control measure.
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Lemma 5 Let Q be a compact and convex subset of . A restricted -divergence D :
Q! [0;1] is a statistical distance. Moreover,
(i) if q 2 Q, then D (jjq) : ! [0;1] is strictly convex;
(ii) if p 2  and p  Q, then D (pjj) : Q! [0;1] is strictly convex.
Proof It is well known that on  the function D is jointly lower semicontinuous and
convex and satises the property
D (pjjq) = 0 () p = q
By Lemma 1, it follows that D :   Q ! [0;1] is a statistical distance. We next prove
points (i) and (ii).
(i). Consider q 2 Q. Let p0; p00 2  and  2 (0; 1) be such that p0 6= p00 andD (p0 + (1  ) p00jjq) <
1. If eitherD (p0jjq) orD (p00jjq) are not nite, we trivially conclude thatD (p0 + (1  ) p00jjq) <
1 = D (p0jjq)+(1  )D (p00jjq). Let us then assume that both D (p0jjq) and D (p00jjq)
are nite. By denition of D and since  (q) is convex, this implies that p0; p00 2  (q)
as well as p0 + (1  ) p00 2  (q). Since p0 and p00 are distinct, we have that dp0=dq and
dp00=dq take di¤erent values on a set of strictly positive q-measure: call it ~S. Since  is
strictly convex, it follows that



dp0
dq
(s) + (1  ) dp
00
dq
(s)

< 

dp0
dq
(s)

+ (1  )

dp00
dq
(s)

8s 2 ~S
By denition of D, this implies that
D
 
p0 + (1  ) p00jjq = Z
S


d [p0 + (1  ) p00]
dq
(s)

dq (s)
=
Z
S



dp0
dq
(s) + (1  ) dp
00
dq
(s)

dq (s)
=
Z
~S



dp0
dq
(s) + (1  ) dp
00
dq
(s)

dq (s)
+
Z
Sn ~S



dp0
dq
(s) + (1  ) dp
00
dq
(s)

dq (s)
< 
Z
S


dp0
dq
(s)

dq (s) + (1  )
Z
S


dp00
dq
(s)

dq (s)
= D
 
p0jjq+ (1  )D  p00jjq
We conclude that D (jjq) : ! [0;1] is strictly convex.
(ii). Before starting, we make three observations.
a. Since Q is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of , note that there exists
q 2 Q such that q << q for all q 2 Q. Since p  Q, we have that p  q. This implies also
that q << p for all q 2 Q.
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b. If q  p, then (dp=dq) 1 is well dened almost everywhere (with respect to either p
or q) and can be chosen (after dening arbitrarily the function over a set of zero measure)
to be the Radon-Nikodym derivative dq=dp.
c. Since  is strictly convex, if we dene ? : (0;1)! [0;1) by ? (x) = x (1=x) for all
x > 0, then also ? is strictly convex. By point b, if p 2  and q 2 Q are such that p  q
and we dene _p = dp=dq, then q (f _p = 0g) = 0 = p (f _p = 0g) and
D (pjjq) =
Z
S


dp
dq

dq =
Z
f _p=0g


dp
dq

dq +
Z
f _p>0g


dp
dq

dq
=
Z
f _p>0g

0B@ 1
dp
dq
 1
1CA dq = Z
f _p>0g
?

dq
dp

dp
dq
dq
=
Z
f _p>0g
?

dq
dp

dp
We can now prove the statement. Let q0; q00 2 Q and  2 (0; 1) be such that q0 6= q00
and D (pjjq0 + (1  ) q00) <1. If either D (pjjq0) or D (pjjq00) are not nite, we trivially
conclude that D (pjjq0 + (1  ) q00) < 1 = D (pjjq0) + (1  )D (pjjq00). Let us then
assume that both D (pjjq0) and D (pjjq00) are nite. By denition of D, we can conclude
that p << q0 and p << q00. By point a, this yields that q0  p  q00 and p  q0+(1  ) q00.
Since q0 and q00 are distinct, we have that dq0=dp and dq00=dp take di¤erent values on a set of
strictly positive p-measure: call it ~S. By point c, we have that
p

dp
d [q0 + (1  ) q00] = 0

= p

dp
dq0
= 0

= p

dp
dq00
= 0

= 0
Thus, by point c and since dq0=dp and dq00=dp take di¤erent values on a set of strictly positive
p-measure, there exists a p-measure 1 set ~S such that
D
 
pjjq0 + (1  ) q00 = Z
~S
?

d [q0 + (1  ) q00]
dp

dp
< 
Z
~S


dq0
dp

dp+ (1  )
Z
~S


dq00
dp

dp
= D
 
pjjq0+ (1  )D  pjjq00
proving point (ii).
A.1.3 Non-convex set of structured models
Let us consider two decision makers who adopt criterion (17), the rst one posits a, possibly
non-convex, set of structured models Q and the second one posits its closed convex hull coQ.
So, the second decision maker considers also all the mixtures of structured models posited
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by the rst decision maker. Next we show that their preferences over acts actually agree.
It is thus without loss of generality to assume that the set of posited structured models is
convex, as it was assumed in the main text. Before doing so we prove formula (18). Observe
that given a compact subset Q  , be that convex or not, we have
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R (pjjq)

= min
p2
min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dp+ R (pjjq)

= min
q2Q
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ R (pjjq)

= min
q2Q
 1
Z
 (u (f)) dq

where  (t) =  e  1 t for all t 2 R where  > 0.
Proposition 9 If Q   is compact, then for each f 2 F
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R (pjjq)

= min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+  min
q2coQ
R (pjjq)

Proof First observe that coQ  . Indeed, since Q is a compact subset of , the
set function  :  ! [0; 1], dened by  (E) = minq2Q q (E) for all E 2  is an exact
capacity which is continuous at S. This implies that Q  core   , yielding that
coQ  core   . Given what we have shown before we can conclude that
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R (pjjq)

= min
q2Q
 1
Z
 (u (f)) dq

=  1

min
q2Q
Z
 (u (f)) dq

=  1

min
q2coQ
Z
 (u (f)) dq

= min
q2coQ
 1
Z
 (u (f)) dq

= min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+  min
q2coQ
R (pjjq)

proving the statement. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The result follows from the following lemma. Here, as usual,  is extended to R by setting
 (t) = +1 if t =2 [0;+1). In particular,  is nondecreasing.
Lemma 6 For each Q   and each  > 0,
inf
p2
Z
u (f) dp+  inf
q2Q
D(pjjq)

=  inf
q2Q
sup
2R

  
Z


   u (f)


dq

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for all u : X ! R and all f : S ! X such that u  f is bounded and measurable.
Proof By Theorem 4.2 of Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007), for each q 2  it holds
inf
p2
Z
dp+D(pjjq)

= sup
2R

  
Z
 (   ) dq

for all  2 L1 (q). Then, if u  f is bounded and measurable, from u  f 2 L1 (q) for all
q 2 , it follows that, for all  > 0,
inf
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ D(pjjq)

=  inf
p2
Z
u (f)

dp+D(pjjq)

=  sup
2R

  
Z


   u (f)


dq

for all  > 0, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 1 In view of the last lemma, it is enough to observe that, if f : S ! X
is simple and measurable, then u  f is simple and measurable for all u : X ! R. 
A.3 Representation results
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on four key steps. We rst provide a representation for
an unbounded and objectively Q-coherent dominance relation %(Appendix A.3.1). Second,
we provide a representation for a pair of binary relations (%;%) which satisfy all of the
assumptions of Theorem 1 with the exception of subjective Q-coherence (Appendix A.3.2).
Third, we provide two results regarding variational preferences which will help isolate the
set of structured models Q in the main representation (Appendix A.3.3). Finally, we merge
these three steps to prove our rst representation result (Appendix A.3.4). The proof of
Theorem 2 instead is presented as one result and it relies on some of the aforementioned
results. In what follows, given a function c :   Q ! [0;1], where Q is a compact and
convex subset of , we say that c is a weak divergence if it satises the rst two properties
dening divergences.
A.3.1 A Bewley-type representation
The next result is a multi-utility (variational) representation for unbounded dominance re-
lations.
Lemma 7 Let % be a binary relation on F , where (S;) is a standard Borel space. The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) % is an unbounded dominance relation which satises objective Q-coherence;
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(ii) there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a weak divergence c : Q! [0;1]
such that dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
(30)
To prove this result, we need to introduce one mathematical object. Let  be a binary
relation on B0 (). We say that  is convex niveloidal if and only if  is a preorder that
satises the following ve properties:
1. For each '; 2 B0 () and for each k 2 R
'   =) '+ k   + k
2. If '; 2 B0 () and fkngn2N  R are such that kn " k and '  kn   for all n 2 N,
then '  k   ;
3. For each '; 2 B0 ()
'   =) '   
4. For each k; h 2 R and for each ' 2 B0 ()
k > h =) '+ k  '+ h
5. For each '; ;  2 B0 () and for each  2 (0; 1)
'   and    =) '+ (1  )  
Lemma 8 If % is an unbounded dominance relation, then there exists an onto a¢ ne func-
tion u : X ! R such that
x % y () u (x)  u (y) (31)
Proof Since % is a non-trivial preorder on F that satises c-completeness, continuity and
weak c-independence, it is immediate to conclude that % restricted to X satises weak
order, continuity and risk independence.26 By Herstein and Milnor (1953), it follows that
there exists an a¢ ne function u : X ! R that satises (31). Since % is a non-trivial preorder
26To prove that % satises risk independence, it su¢ ces to deploy the same technique of Lemma 28 of
Maccheroni et al. (2006) and observe that % is a complete preorder on X. This yields that
x  y =) 1
2
x+
1
2
z  1
2
y +
1
2
z 8z 2 X
By Theorem 2 of Herstein and Milnor (1953) and since % satises continuity, we can conclude that %
satises risk independence.
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on F that satises monotonicity, we have that % is non-trivial on X. By Lemma 59 of
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) and since % is non-trivial on X and satises unboundedness,
we can conclude that u is onto. 
Since u is a¢ ne and onto, note that fu (f) : f 2 Fg = B0 (). In light of this observation,
we can dene a binary relation  on B0 (). In this case, we set
'   () f % g where u (f) = ' and u (g) =  (32)
Lemma 9 If % is an unbounded dominance relation, then , dened as in (32), is a well
dened convex niveloidal binary relation. Moreover, if % is objectively Q-coherent, then
'
Q
=  implies '   .
Proof We begin by showing that  is well dened. Assume that f1; f2; g1; g2 2 F are
such that u (fi) = ' and u (gi) =  for all i 2 f1; 2g. It follows that u (f1 (s)) = u (f2 (s))
and u (g1 (s)) = u (g2 (s)) for all s 2 S. By Lemma 8, this implies that f1 (s)  f2 (s) and
g1 (s)  g2 (s) for all s 2 S. Since % is a preorder that satises monotonicity, this implies
that f1  f2 and g1  g2. Since % is a preorder, if f1 % g1, then
f2 % f1 % g1 % g2 =) f2 % g2
that is, f1 % g1 implies f2 % g2. Similarly, we can prove that f2 % g2 implies f1 % g1. In
other words, f1 % g1 if and only if f2 % g2, proving that  is well dened. It is immediate
to prove that  is a preorder. We next prove properties 15.
1. Consider '; 2 B0 () and k 2 R. Assume that '   . Let f; g 2 F and x; y 2 X be
such that u (f) = 2', u (g) = 2 , u (x) = 0 and u (y) = 2k. Since u is a¢ ne, it follows
that
u

1
2
f +
1
2
x

=
1
2
u (f) +
1
2
u (x) = '   
=
1
2
u (g) +
1
2
u (x) = u

1
2
g +
1
2
x

proving that 12f +
1
2x %
1
2g +
1
2x. Since % satises weak c-independence and u is
a¢ ne, we have that 12f +
1
2y %
1
2g +
1
2y, yielding that
'+ k =
1
2
u (f) +
1
2
u (y) = u

1
2
f +
1
2
y

 u

1
2
g +
1
2
y

=
1
2
u (g) +
1
2
u (y) =  + k
2. Consider '; 2 B0 () and fkngn2N  R such that kn " k and '   kn   for all
n 2 N. We have two cases:
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(a) k > 0. Consider f; g; h 2 F such that
u (f) = ', u (g) = '  k and u (h) =  
Since k > 0 and kn " k, there exists n 2 N such that kn > 0 for all n  n. Dene
n = 1   kn=k for all n 2 N. It follows that n 2 [0; 1] for all n  n. Since u is
a¢ ne, for each n  n
u (nf + (1  n) g) = nu (f) + (1  n)u (g) = '  kn   = u (h)
yielding that nf + (1  n) g % h for all n  n. Since % satises continuity
and n ! 0, we have that g % h, that is,
'  k = u (g)  u (h) =  
(b) k  0. Since fkngn2N is convergent, fkngn2N is bounded. Thus, there exists h > 0
such that kn + h > 0 for all n 2 N. Moreover, kn + h " k + h > 0. By point 1, we
also have that '  (kn + h) = ('  kn) h    h for all n 2 N. By subpoint a,
we can conclude that ('  k)  h = '  (k + h)     h. By point 1, we obtain
that '  k   .
3. Consider '; 2 B0 () such that '   . Let f; g 2 F be such that u (f) = ' and
u (g) =  . It follows that u (f (s))  u (g (s)) for all s 2 S. By Lemma 8, this implies
that f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S. Since % satises monotonicity, this implies that
f % g, yielding that ' = u (f)  u (g) =  .
4. Consider k; h 2 R and ' 2 B0 (). We rst assume that k > h and k = 0. By point
3, we have that ' = ' + k  ' + h. By contradiction, assume that ' 6 ' + h. It
follows that '  ' + h, yielding that I = fw 2 R : '  '+ wg is a non-empty set
which contains 0 and h. We next prove that I is an unbounded interval, that is, I = R.
First, consider w1; w2 2 I. Without loss of generality, assume that w1  w2. By point
3 and since w1; w2 2 I, we have that for each  2 (0; 1)
'  '+ w1  '+ (w1 + (1  )w2)  '+ w2  '
proving that '  ' + (w1 + (1  )w2), that is, w1 + (1  )w2 2 I. Next, we
observe that I \ ( 1; 0) 6= ; 6= I \ (0;1). Since h 2 I and h < 0, we have that
I \ ( 1; 0) 6= ;. Since I is an interval and 0; h 2 I, we have that h=2 2 I. By
point 1 and since '  ' + h=2, we have that '   h=2  ('+ h=2)   h=2 = ',
proving that 0 <  h=2 2 I \ (0;1). By denition of I, note that if w 2 In f0g,
then ' + w  '. By point 1 and since w=2 2 I and  is a preorder, we have that
('+ w) + w=2  ' + w=2  ', that is, 32w; 12w 2 I. Since I is an interval, we have
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that either
 
3
2w;
1
2w
  I if w < 0 or  12w; 32w  I if w > 0. This will help us in
proving that I is unbounded from below and above. By contradiction, assume that
I is bounded from below and dene m = inf I. Since I \ ( 1; 0) 6= ;, we have that
m < 0. Consider fwngn2N  I \ ( 1; 0) such that wn # m. Since
 
3
2wn;
1
2wn
  I for
all n 2 N, it follows that m  32wn for all n 2 N. By passing to the limit, we obtain
that m  32m < 0, a contradiction. By contradiction, assume that I is bounded from
above and dene M = sup I. Since I \ (0;1) 6= ;, we have that M > 0. Consider
fwngn2N  I\ (0;1) such that wn "M . Since
 
1
2wn;
3
2wn
  I for all n 2 N, it follows
that M  32wn for all n 2 N. By passing to the limit, we obtain that M  32M > 0,
a contradiction. To sum up, I is a non-empty unbounded interval, that is, I = R.
This implies that '  ' + w for all w 2 R. In particular, select w1 = k'k1 + 1 and
w2 =  k'k1   1. Since  is a preorder, we have that '+ w1  '+ w2. Moreover,
'+w1  1 >  1  '+w2. By point 3, this implies that '+w1  1   1  '+w2.
Since  is a preorder and '+w1  '+w2, we can conclude that 1   1. Note also
that there exist x; y 2 X such that u (x) = 1 and u (y) =  1. By Lemma 8, this implies
that x  y. By denition of  and since u (x) = 1   1 = u (y), we also have that
y % x, a contradiction. Thus, we proved that if k > h and k = 0, then '+k  '+h.
Assume simply that k > h. This implies that 0 > h   k and '  ' + (h  k). By
point 1, we can conclude that '+ k  '+ (h  k) + k = '+ h.
5. Consider '; ;  2 B0 () and  2 (0; 1). Assume that '   and   . Let
f; g; h 2 F be such that u (f) = ', u (g) =  and u (h) = . By assumption and
denition of , we have that f % h and g % h. Since % satises convexity and
u is a¢ ne, this implies that f + (1  ) g % h, yielding that ' + (1  ) =
u (f) + (1  )u (g) = u (f + (1  ) g)  u (h) = .
Points 15 prove the rst part of the statement. Finally, consider '; 2 B0 (). Note
that there exist a partition fAigni=1 of S and figni=1 and figni=1 in R such that
' =
nX
i=1
i1Ai and  =
nX
i=1
i1Ai
Note that fs 2 S : ' (s) 6=  (s)g = [i2f1;:::;ng:i 6=iAi. Since '
Q
=  , we have that q (Ai) = 0
for all q 2 Q and for all i 2 f1; :::; ng such that i 6= i. Since u is unbounded, dene
fxigni=1  X to be such that u (xi) = i for all i 2 f1; :::; ng. Since u is unbounded, dene
fyigni=1  X to be such that yi = xi for all i 2 f1; :::; ng such that i = i and u (yi) = i
otherwise. Dene f; g : S ! X by f (s) = xi and g (s) = yi for all s 2 Ai and for all
i 2 f1; :::; ng. It is immediate to see that f Q= g as well as u (f) = ' and u (g) =  . Since %
is objectively Q-coherent, we have that f  g, yielding that '   and proving the second
part of the statement. 
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The next three results (Lemmas 10 and 11 as well as Proposition 10) will help us rep-
resenting . This paired with Lemma 8 and Proposition 11 will yield the proof of Lemma
7.
Lemma 10 Let  be a convex niveloidal binary relation. If  2 B0 (), then U ( ) =
f' 2 B0 () : '   g is a non-empty convex set such that:
1.  2 U ( );
2. if ' 2 B0 () and fkngn2N  R is such that kn " k and '  kn 2 U ( ) for all n 2 N,
then '  k 2 U ( );
3. if k > 0, then    k 62 U ( );
4. if '1  '2 and '2 2 U ( ), then '1 2 U ( );
5. if k  0 and '2 2 U ( ), then '2 + k 2 U ( ).
Proof Since  is reexive, we have that  2 U ( ), proving that U ( ) is non-empty and
point 1. Consider '1; '2 2 U ( ) and  2 (0; 1). By denition, we have that '1   and
'2   . Since  satises convexity, we have that '1+(1  )'2   , proving convexity
of U ( ). Consider ' 2 B0 () and fkngn2N  R such that kn " k and '  kn 2 U ( ) for all
n 2 N. It follows that '   kn   for all n 2 N, then '   k   , that is, '   k 2 U ( ),
proving point 2. If k > 0, then 0 >  k and  =  + 0     k, that is,    k 62 U ( ),
proving point 3. Consider '1  '2 such that '2 2 U ( ), then '1  '2 and '2   ,
yielding that '1   and, in particular, '1 2 U ( ), proving point 4. Finally, to prove point
5, it is enough to set '1 = '2 + k in point 4. 
Before stating the next result, we dene few properties that will turn out to be useful
later on. A functional I : B0 ()! R is:
1. a niveloid if I (')  I ( )  sups2S (' (s)   (s)) for all '; 2 B0 ();
2. normalized if I (k) = k for all k 2 R;27
3. monotone if for each '; 2 B0 ()
'   =) I (')  I ( )
4.  consistent if for each '; 2 B0 ()
'   =) I (')  I ( )
27With the usual abuse of notation, we denote by k both the real number and the constant function taking
value k.
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5. concave if for each '; 2 B0 () and  2 (0; 1)
I ('+ (1  ) )  I (') + (1  ) I ( )
6. translation invariant if for each ' 2 B0 () and k 2 R
I ('+ k) = I (') + k
Lemma 11 Let  be a convex niveloidal binary relation. If  2 B0 (), then the functional
I : B0 ()! R, dened by
I (') = max fk 2 R : '  k 2 U ( )g 8' 2 B0 ()
is a concave niveloid which is  consistent and such that I ( ) = 0. Moreover, we have
that:
1. The functional I = I  I (0) is a normalized concave niveloid which is  consistent.
2. If  satises
 
Q
=  0 =)    0
then
 
Q
=  0 =) I = I 0 and I = I 0
Proof Consider ' 2 B0 (). Dene C' = fk 2 R : '  k 2 U ( )g. Note that C' is non-
empty. Indeed, if we set k =  k'k1 k k1, then we obtain that ' k = '+k'k1+k k1 
0 + k k1   2 U ( ). By property 4 of Lemma 10, we can conclude that '   k 2 U ( ),
that is, k 2 C'. Since U ( ) is convex, it follows that C' is an interval. Since ' 2 B0 (),
note that there exists k^ 2 R such that   '  k^. It follows that   '  k^. In particular,
we can conclude that   '  

k^ + "

for all " > 0. This yields that C' is bounded from
above. Finally, assume that fkngn2N  C' and kn " k. By property 2 of Lemma 10, we can
conclude that k 2 C'. To sum up, C' is a non-empty bounded from above interval of R that
satises the property
fkngn2N  C' and kn " k =) k 2 C' (33)
The rst part yields that sup fk 2 R : '  k 2 U ( )g = supC' 2 R is well dened. By
(33), we also have that supC' 2 C', that is, supC' = maxC', proving that I is well
dened. Next, we prove that I is a concave niveloid. We rst show that I is monotone
and translation invariant. By Proposition 2 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2014), this implies
that I is a niveloid. Rather than proving monotonicity, we prove that I is  consistent.28
28Since if '1  '2, then '1  '2, it follows that  consistency implies monotonicity.
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Consider '1; '2 2 B0 () such that '1  '2. By the properties of  and denition of I ,
we have that
'1   I ('2)  '2   I ('2) and '2   I ('2) 2 U ( )
and, in particular, '2 I ('2)   . Since  is a preorder, this implies that '1 I ('2) 
 , that is, '1   I ('2) 2 U ( ) and I ('2) 2 C'1 , proving that I ('1)  I ('2). We next
prove translation invariance. Consider ' 2 B0 () and k 2 R. By denition of I , we can
conclude that
('+ k)  (I (') + k) = '  I (') 2 U ( )
This implies that I (') + k 2 C'+k and, in particular, I ('+ k)  I (') + k. Since k and
' were arbitrarily chosen, we have that
I ('+ k)  I (') + k 8' 2 B0 () ;8k 2 R
This yields that I ('+ k) = I (') + k for all ' 2 B0 () and for all k 2 R.29
We move to prove that I is concave. Consider '1; '2 2 B0 () and  2 (0; 1). By
denition of I , we have that
'1   I ('1) 2 U ( ) and '2   I ('2) 2 U ( )
Since U ( ) is convex, we have that
('1 + (1  )'2)  (I ('1) + (1  ) I ('2))
=  ('1   I ('1)) + (1  ) ('2   I ('2)) 2 U ( )
yielding that I ('1)+(1  ) I ('2) 2 C'1+(1 )'2 and, in particular, I ('1 + (1  )'2) 
I ('1) + (1  ) I ('2).
Finally, since  2 U ( ), note that 0 2 C and I ( )  0. By denition of I , if
I ( ) > 0, then    I ( ) 2 U ( ), a contradiction with property 3 of Lemma 10.
1. It is routine to check that I is a normalized concave niveloid which is  consistent.
2. Clearly, we have that if    0, then U ( ) = U ( 0), yielding that I = I 0 and, in
particular, I (0) = I 0 (0) as well as I = I 0 . 
Proposition 10 Let  be a binary relation on B0 (). The following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i)  is convex niveloidal;
29Observe that if ' 2 B0 () and k 2 R, then  k 2 R and
I (') = I (('+ k)  k)  I ('+ k)  k
yielding that I ('+ k)  I (') + k.
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(ii) there exists a family of concave niveloids fIg2A on B0 () such that
'   () I (')  I ( ) 8 2 A (34)
(iii) there exists a family of normalized concave niveloids

I
	
2A on B0 () such that
'   () I (')  I ( ) 8 2 A (35)
Proof (iii) implies (i). It is trivial.
(i) implies (ii). Let A = B0 (). We next show that
'1  '2 () I ('1)  I ('2) 8 2 B0 ()
where I is dened as in Lemma 11 for all  2 B0 (). By Lemma 11, we have that I is
 consistent for all  2 B0 (). This implies that
'1  '2 =) I ('1)  I ('2) 8 2 B0 ()
Vice versa, consider '1; '2 2 B0 (). Assume that I ('1)  I ('2) for all  2 B0 (). Let
 = '2. By Lemma 11, we have that
I'2 ('1)  I'2 ('2) = 0
yielding that '1  '1   I'2 ('1) 2 U ('2). By point 4 of Lemma 10, this implies that
'1 2 U ('2), that is, '1  '2.
(ii) implies (iii). Given a family of concave niveloids fIg2A, dene I = I  I (0) for
all  2 A. It is immediate to verify that I is a normalized concave niveloid for all  2 A.
It is also immediate to observe that
I ('1)  I ('2) 8 2 A () I ('1)  I ('2) 8 2 A
proving the implication. 
Remark 1 Given a convex niveloidal binary relation  on B0 (), we call canonical (resp.,
canonical normalized) the representation fI g 2B0() (resp.,

I 
	
 2B0()) obtained from
Lemma 11 and the proof of Proposition 10. By the previous proof, clearly, fI g 2B0() and
I 
	
 2B0() satisfy (34) and (35) respectively.
The next result claries what the relation is between any representation of  and the
canonical ones. This will be useful in establishing an extra property of

I 
	
 2B0() in
Corollary 1.
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Lemma 12 Let  be a convex niveloidal binary relation. If B is an index set and fJg2B
is a family of normalized concave niveloids such that
'   () J (')  J ( ) 8 2 B
then for each  2 B0 ()
I (') = inf
2B
(J (')  J ( )) 8' 2 B0 () (36)
and
I (') = inf
2B
(J (')  J ( )) + sup
2B
J ( ) 8' 2 B0 () (37)
Proof Fix ' 2 B0 () and  2 B0 (). By denition, we have that
I (') = max fk 2 R : '  k 2 U ( )g
Since fJg2B represents  and each J is translation invariant, note that for each k 2 R
'  k 2 U ( ) () '  k   () J ('  k)  J ( ) 8 2 B
() J (')  k  J ( ) 8 2 B () J (')  J ( )  k 8 2 B
() inf
2B
(J (')  J ( ))  k
Since '   I (') 2 U ( ), this implies that I (') = inf2B (J (')  J ( )). Since ' and
 were arbitrarily chosen, (36) follows. Since I = I   I (0), we only need to compute
 I (0). Since each J is normalized, we have that  I (0) =   inf2B (J (0)  J ( )) =
  inf2B ( J ( )) = sup2B J ( ), proving (37). 
Corollary 1 If  is a convex niveloidal binary relation, then I0  I for all  2 B0 ().
Proof By Lemma 12 and Remark 1 and since each I 0 is a normalized concave niveloid, we
have that
I0 (') = inf
 02B0()
 
I 0 (')  I 0 (0)

+ sup
 02B0()
I 0 (0) = inf
 02B0()
I 0 (')  I (') 8' 2 B0 ()
for all  2 B0 (), proving the statement. 
The next result will be instrumental in providing a niveloidal multi-representation of %
when jQj  2. In order to discuss it, we need a piece of terminology. We denote by V the
quotient space B0 () =M whereM is the vector subspace
n
' 2 B0 () : ' Q= 0
o
. Recall that
the elements of V are equivalence classes [ ] with  2 B0 () where  0;  00 2 [ ] if and only
if  
Q
=  0 Q=  00.
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Proposition 11 If (S;) is a standard Borel space and jQj  2, then there exists a bijection
f : V ! Q.
Proof We begin by observing that:
jca ()j  jca+ () ca+ ()j = jca+ ()j = j(0;1)j = jj
The rst inequality holds because the map g : ca () ! ca+ ()  ca+ (), dened by
 7! (+;  ), is injective. Since  is non-trivial, ca+ () is innite and a bijection justifying
the rst equality exists by Theorem 1.4.5 of Srivastava (1998). As to the second equality,
the map g : ca+ () n f0g ! (0;1)  , dened by  7! ( (S) ; = (S)), is a bijection
and so jca+ () n f0gj = j(0;1)j; by Theorem 1.3.1 of Srivastava (1998), jca+ ()j =
jca+ () n f0gj = j(0;1)j. As to the last equality, by Theorem 1.4.5 and Exercise
1.5.1 of Srivastava (1998), being j(0;1)j = j(0; 1)j  jj, we have jj  j(0;1)j =
j(0; 1)j  j j = jj, yielding that j(0;1)j = jj.
We conclude that jca ()j  jj, that is, there exists an injective map g : ca ()! .
Since Q is a compact and convex subset of , there exists q 2 Q such that q  q for all
q 2 Q. We dene h : V ! ca () by
h ([ ]) (A) =
Z
A
 dq 8A 2 
Note that h is well dened. For, if  0 2 [ ], that is,  Q=  0, then  q=  0, yielding thatR
A  dq =
R
A  
0dq for all A 2 . Similarly, h ([ ]) = h ([ 0]) implies that  q=  0. Since
q  q for all q 2 Q, this implies that  Q=  0 and [ ] = [ 0], proving h is injective. This
implies that ~f = gh is a well dened injective function from V to . Clearly, we have that
jj 
 ~f (V )  j[0; 1]j. Since (S;) is a standard Borel space and Q is convex and jQj  2,
we also have that j[0; 1]j  jj  jQj  [0; 1]. This implies that jV j =
 ~f (V ) = jQj, proving
the statement. 
Proof of Lemma 7 (ii) implies (i). It is trivial.
(i) implies (ii). Since % is objectively Q-coherent, if jQj = 1, that is Q = fqg, then
% is complete. By Maccheroni et al. (2006) and since % is unbounded, it follows that
there exists an onto and a¢ ne u : X ! R and a grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex
cq : ! [0;1] such that V : F ! R dened by
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ cq (p)

8f 2 F
represents %. If we dene c : Q! [0;1] by c (p; q) = cq (p) for all (p; q) 2 Q, then
we have that c is a weak divergence. By Lemma 15 and since % is objectively Q-coherent,
it follows that c (p; q) = 1 for all p 2 n(Q) and for all q 2 Q, proving the implication.
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Assume jQj > 1. By Lemma 8, there exists an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R which
represents % on X. By Lemma 9, this implies that we can consider the convex niveloidal
binary relation  dened as in (32). By denition of  and Proposition 10 (and its proof),
we have that
f % g () u (f)  u (g) () I (u (f))  I (u (g)) 8 2 B0 ()
where each I is a normalized concave niveloid. As before, consider V = B0 () =M where
M is the vector subspace
n
' 2 B0 () : ' Q= 0
o
. For each equivalence class [ ], select exactly
one  0 2 B0 () such that  0 2 [ ]. We denote this subset of B0 () by ~V . Clearly, we have
that
I (u (f))  I (u (g)) 8 2 B0 () =) I (u (f))  I (u (g)) 8 2 ~V
Vice versa, assume that I (u (f))  I (u (g)) for all  2 ~V . Consider  ^ 2 B0 (). It
follows that there exists [ ] in V such that  ^ 2 [ ]. Similarly, consider  0 2 ~V such that
 0 2 [ ]. It follows that  ^ Q=  0. By Lemmas 9 and 11 and since % is objectively Q-
coherent, then I ^ =
I 0 , yielding that I ^ (u (f))  I ^ (u (g)). Since  ^ was arbitrarily chosen
I (u (f))  I (u (g)) for all  2 B0 (). By construction, observe that there exists a
bijection ~f : ~V ! V . By Proposition 11, we have that there exists a bijection f : V ! Q.
Dene f = f  ~f . By Corollary 1, if we dene I^q = I f 1(q) for all q 2 Q, then we have that
I^ f(0)  I^q 8q 2 Q
and
f % g () I (u (f))  I (u (g)) 8 2 B0 () () I (u (f))  I (u (g)) 8 2 ~V
() I^q (u (f))  I^q (u (g)) 8q 2 Q
Since each I^q is a normalized concave niveloid, we have that for each q 2 Q there exists a
function cq : ! [0;1] which is grounded, lower semicontinuous, convex and such that
I^q (') = min
p2
Z
'dp+ cq (p)

8' 2 B0 ()
If we dene c : Q! [0;1] by c (p; q) = cq (p) for all (p; q) 2 Q, then c satises the
rst property dening a divergence and (30) holds. By Lemma 15 and (30) and since % is
objectively Q-coherent, it follows that c (p; q) = 1 for all p 62 n(Q) and for all q 2 Q.
Finally, recall that
c (p; q) = sup
'2B0()

I^q (') 
Z
'dp

8q 2 Q;8p 2 
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Consider q 2 Q and p 2 n(Q). It follows that there exists A 2  such that q (A) = 0 for
all q 2 Q and p (A) > 0. By Lemma 9 and since % is objectively Q-coherent, we have that
1A  0 for all  2 R. Since I^ f(0)  I^q all q 2 Q, we have that for each q 2 Q
c
 
p; f (0)

= sup
'2B0()

I^ f(0) (') 
Z
'dp

 sup
'2B0()

I^q (') 
Z
'dp

= c (p; q) 8p 2 
Since c
 ; f (0) is grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex and f (0) 2 Q, this implies
that cQ () = minq2Q c (; q) = c
 ; f (0) is well dened and shares the same properties,
proving that c is a weak divergence. 
A.3.2 A parametric representation
Lemma 13 Let (%;%) be two binary relations on F , where (S;) is a standard Borel space.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) % is an unbounded dominance relation satisfying objective Q-coherence and % is a
rational preference that jointly satisfy consistency and caution;
(ii) there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a weak divergence c : Q! [0;1]
such that dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
as well as
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ cQ (p)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ cQ (p)

Proof (i) implies (ii). We proceed by steps. Before starting, we make one observation. By
Lemma 7 and since % is an unbounded dominance relation which is objectively Q-coherent
there exist an onto a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a weak divergence c : Q! [0;1] such
that % is objectively Q-coherent, it follows that dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q
We are left to show that cQ : ! [0;1] is such that
f % g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ cQ (p)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ cQ (p)

(38)
To prove this we assume that c is as in the proof of (i) implies (ii) in Lemma 7. This covers
both cases jQj = 1 and jQj > 1. In particular, for each q 2 Q dene I^q : B0 ()! R by
I^q (') = min
p2
Z
'dp+ c (p; q)

8' 2 B0 ()
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and recall that there exists q^(= f (0) when jQj > 1) such that c (; q^)  c (; q), thus I^q^  I^q,
for all q 2 Q.
Step 1. % agrees with % on X. In particular, u : X ! R represents % and %.
Proof of the Step Note that % and % restricted to X are continuous weak orders that satisfy
risk independence. Moreover, by the observation above, % is represented by u. By Herstein
and Milnor (1953) and since % is non-trivial, it follows that there exists a non-constant and
a¢ ne function v : X ! R that represents % on X. Since (%;%) jointly satisfy consistency,
it follows that for each x; y 2 X
u (x)  u (y) =) v (x)  v (y)
By Ghirardato et al. (2004), u and v are equal up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation,
hence the statement. We can set v = u. 
Step 2. There exists a normalized, monotone and continuous functional I : B0 ()! R such
that
f % g () I (u (f))  I (u (g))
Proof of the Step By Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) and since % is a rational preference
relation, the statement follows. 
Step 3. I (')  infq2Q I^q (') for all ' 2 B0 ().
Proof of the Step Consider ' 2 B0 (). Since each I^q is normalized and monotone and
u is onto, we have that I^q (') 2 [infs2S ' (s) ; sups2S ' (s)]  Imu for all q 2 Q. Since
' 2 B0 (), it follows that there exists f 2 F such that ' = u (f) and x 2 X such that
u (x) = infq2Q I^q ('). For each " > 0 there exists x" 2 X such that u (x") = u (x) + ".
Since infq2Q I^q (') = u (x), it follows that for each " > 0 there exists q 2 Q such that
I^q (u (f)) = I^q (') < u (x") = I^q (u (x")), yielding that f 6% x". Since (%;%) jointly satisfy
caution, we have that x" % f for all " > 0. By Step 2, this implies that
u (x) + " = u (x") = I (u (x"))  I (u (f)) = I (') 8" > 0
that is, infq2Q I^q (') = u (x)  I ('), proving the step. 
Step 4. I (')  infq2Q I^q (') for all ' 2 B0 ().
Proof of the Step Consider ' 2 B0 (). We use the same objects and notation of Step 3.
Note that for each q0 2 Q
I^q0 (u (f)) = I^q0 (')  inf
q2Q
I^q (') = u (x) = I^q0 (u (x))
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that is, f % x. Since (%;%) jointly satisfy consistency, we have that f % x. By Step 2,
this implies that
I (') = I (u (f))  I (u (x)) = u (x) = inf
q2Q
I^q (')
proving the step. 
Step 5. I (') = minp2
R
'dp+ cQ (p)
	
for all ' 2 B0 ().
Proof of the Step By Steps 3 and 4 and since I^q^  I^q for all q 2 Q, we have that
I (') = min
q2Q
I^q (') = I^q^ (') 8' 2 B0 ()
Since c (; q^) = cQ (), it follows that for each ' 2 B0 ()
I (') = I^q^ (') = min
p2
Z
'dp+ c (p; q^)

= min
p2
Z
'dp+ cQ (p)

proving the step. 
Thus, (38) follows from Steps 2 and 5, this completes the proof.
(ii) implies (i). It is routine. 
A.3.3 Two variational lemmas
The next two lemmas will be key in characterizing subjective and objective Q-coherence.
Lemma 14 Let % be a variational preference represented by V : F ! R dened by
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p)

and let p 2 . If % is unbounded, then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) c (p) = 0;
(ii) xpf % f for all f 2 F ;
(iii) for each f 2 F and for each x 2 X
x  xpf =) x  f:
Proof We actually prove that (i)=)(ii)()(iii), with equivalence when % is unbounded.
(i) implies (ii). Let f 2 F . It is enough to observe that c (p) = 0 implies
V

xpf

= u

xpf

=
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p)  min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p)

= V (f)
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yielding that xpf % f .
(ii) implies (iii). Assume that xpf % f for all f 2 F . Since % is complete and transitive,
it follows that if x  xpf , then x  f .
(iii) implies (ii). By contradiction, suppose that there exists f 2 F such that f  xpf .
Let xf 2 X be such that xf  f . This implies that xf  xpf and so xf  f , a contradiction.
(ii) implies (i). Let % be unbounded. Assume that xpf % f for all f 2 F , i.e., V (f) R
u (f) dp for all f 2 F . So, p corresponds to a SEU preference that is more ambiguity averse
than %. By Lemma 32 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), we can conclude that c (p) = 0. 
Lemma 15 Let % be a variational preference represented by V : F ! R dened by
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p)

If Q is a compact and convex subset of  and % is unbounded and such that
f
Q
= g =) f  g
then dom c  (Q).
Proof Let p 2 n(Q). It follows that there exists A 2  such that q (A) = 0 for all
q 2 Q as well as p (A) > 0. Dene I : B0 () ! R by I (') = minp2
R
'dp+ c (p)
	
for all ' 2 B0 (). Since u is unbounded, for each  2 R there exists x 2 X such that
u (x) = . Similarly, there exists y 2 X such that u (y) = 0. For each  2 R dene
f = xAy. By construction, we have that f
Q
= y for all  2 R. This implies that
I (1A) = V (f) = V (y) = I (0) = 0. By Maccheroni et al. (2006) and since u is unbounded,
we have that
c (p) = sup
'2B0()

I (') 
Z
'dp

 sup
2R
fI (1A)  p (A)g =1
Since p was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that dom c  (Q). 
A.3.4 Proof of Theorem 1
We only prove (i) implies (ii), the converse being routine. By Lemma 13, there exist an
onto and a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a weak divergence c :   Q ! [0;1] such that
dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and % is represented by
f % g , min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q (39)
and % is represented by V : F ! R dened by
V (f) = min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ cQ (p)

(40)
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By Lemma 14 and since % is subjectively Q-coherent and % and % coincide on X, we
conclude that c 1Q (0) = Q, proving the implication.
Next, assume that c is uniquely null. Dene the correspondence   : Q Q by
  (q) = fp 2  : c (p; q) = 0g = argmin cq
Since cQ  cq for all q 2 Q and c 1Q (0) = Q, we have that   is well dened. Since cq is
grounded, it follows that   (q) 6= ; for all q 2 Q. Since c is uniquely null and cq is grounded,
we have that c 1q (0) is a singleton, that is,
c (p; q) = c
 
p0; q

= 0 =) p = p0
This implies that   (q) is a singleton, therefore   is a function. Since c 1Q (0) = Q, observe
that
[q2Q  (q) = [q2Q argmin cq = argmin cQ = Q
that is,   is surjective. Since c is uniquely null, we have that c 1p (0) is at most a singleton,
that is,
c (p; q) = c
 
p; q0

= 0 =) q = q0
yielding that   is injective. To sum up,   is a bijection. Dene ~c :   Q ! [0;1]
by ~c (p; q) = c
 
p;  1 (q)

for all (p; q) 2   Q. Note that ~c (; q) is grounded, lower
semicontinuous, convex and dom ~c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q. Next, we show that ~cQ = cQ.
Since cQ is well dened, for each p 2  there exists qp 2 Q such that
~c (p;  (qp)) = c (p; qp) = min
q2Q
c (p; q)  c  p; q0 = ~c  p;   q0 8q0 2 Q
Since   is a bijection, we have that ~c (p;  (qp))  ~c (p; q) for all q 2 Q. Since p was arbitrarily
chosen, it follows that
cQ (p) = min
q2Q
c (p; q) = ~c (p;  (qp)) = min
q2Q
~c (p; q) = ~cQ (p) 8p 2 
To sum up, ~cQ = cQ and ~c
 1
Q (0) = c
 1
Q (0) = Q. In turn, since cQ is grounded, lower
semicontinuous and convex, this implies that ~cQ is grounded, lower semicontinuous and
convex. Since   is a bijection, we can conclude that (39) holds with ~c in place of c and (40)
holds with ~cQ in place of cQ.
We are left to show that ~c (p; q) = 0 if and only if p = q. Since c 1q (0) is a singleton
for all q 2 Q and   is a bijection, if ~c (p; q) = 0, then c  p;  1 (q) = 0, yielding that
p =  
 
  1 (q)

= q. On the other hand, ~c (q; q) = c
 
q;  1 (q)

= 0. We can conclude that
~c (p; q) = 0 if and only if p = q, proving that ~c is a statistical distance. 
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A.3.5 Proof of Theorem 2
We only prove (i) implies (ii), the converse being routine. We proceed by steps.
Step 1. %Q agrees with %Q0 on X for all Q;Q0 2 Q. In particular, there exists an a¢ ne
and onto function u : X ! R representing %Q for all Q 2 Q.
Proof of the Step Let Q;Q0 2 Q be such that Q  Q0. Note that %Q and %Q0 , restricted
to X, satisfy weak order, continuity and risk independence. By Herstein and Milnor (1953)
and since %Q and %Q0 are non-trivial, there exist two nonconstant a¢ ne functions uQ; uQ0 :
X ! R which represent %Q and %Q0 , respectively. Since
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is monotone, we have
that
uQ (x)  uQ (y) =) uQ0 (x)  uQ0 (y)
By Ghirardato et al. (2004), uQ and uQ0 are equal up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation.
Next, x q 2 Q. Set u = uq. Given any other q 2 , consider Q = co fq; qg. By the previous
part, it follows that u Q, uq and uq are equal up to an a¢ ne transformation. Given that q
was arbitrarily chosen, we can set u = uq for all q 2 Q. Similarly, given a generic Q 2 Q,
select q 2 Q. Since Q  fqg, it follows that we can set u = uQ. Since each %Q is unbounded
for all Q 2 Q, we have that u is onto. 
Step 2. For each q 2  there exists a normalized, monotone, translation invariant and
concave functional Iq : B0 ()! R such that
f %q g () Iq (u (f))  Iq (u (g))
Moreover, there exists a unique grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex function cq :
! [0;1] such that
Iq (') = min
p2
Z
'dp+ cq (p)

8' 2 B0 () (41)
Proof of the Step Fix q 2 . Since %q is an unbounded dominance relation which is
complete, we have that %q is a variational preference. By the proof of Theorem 3 and
Proposition 6 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), there exists a normalized, monotone, translation
invariant and concave functional Iq : B0 ()! R such that
f %q g () Iq (u (f))  Iq (u (g))
Moreover, we have that there exists a unique grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex
function cq : ! [0;1] satisfying (41). 
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Dene c :   ! [0;1] by c (p; q) = cq (p) for all (p; q) 2  . Dene the map
J : B0 () ! R by J ('; q) = Iq ('). Observe that, for all (p; q) 2 ,
c (p; q) = cq (p) = sup
'2B0()

Iq (') 
Z
'dp

= sup
'2B0()

J ('; q) 
Z
'dp

(42)
Step 3. J is convex and lower semicontinuous in the second argument.
Proof of the Step Note that for each ' 2 B0 () and for each q 2 
J ('; q) = Iq (') = u (xf;q) where f 2 F is s.t. ' = u (f)
Fix ' 2 B0 () and t 2 R. By Step 1 and since
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is lower semicontinuous on ,
the set
fq 2  : J ('; q)  tg = fq 2  : u (x)  u (xf;q)g = fq 2  : x % xf;qg
is closed where x 2 X and f 2 F are such that u (x) = t as well as u (f) = '. Since ' and t
were arbitrarily chosen, this yields that J is lower semicontinuous in the second argument.
Fix ' 2 B0 (), q; q0 2  and  2 (0; 1). Since
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is averse to model hybridization
and u is a¢ ne,
J
 
'; q + (1  ) q0 = u  xf;q+(1 )q0  u  xf;q + (1  )xf;q0
= u (xf;q) + (1  )u
 
xf;q0

= J ('; q) + (1  ) J  '; q0
where f 2 F is such that u (f) = '. Since ', q, q0 and  were arbitrarily chosen, this yields
that J is convex in the second argument. 
Step 4. c is jointly lower semicontinuous and convex. Moreover, its q-sections are grounded,
lower semicontinuous and convex.
Proof of the Step By Step 3, the map (p; q) 7! J ('; q)   R 'dp, dened over   , is
jointly lower semicontinuous and convex. By (42) and the denition of c, we conclude that
c is jointly lower semicontinuous and convex. By Step 1, the rest of the statement follows.
Step 5. For each Q 2 Q we have that f %Q g if and only if f %q g for all q 2 Q. In
particular, we have that
f %Q g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

8q 2 Q (43)
Proof of the Step Fix Q 2 Q. Since
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is monotone, we have that
f %Q g =) f %q g 8q 2 Q
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Since
n
%Q
o
Q2Q
is Q-separable, we can conclude that f %Q g if and only if f %q g for q 2 Q.
By Step 2 and the denition of c, this implies (43). 
Step 6. %Q agrees with %Q on X for all Q 2 Q. Moreover, %Q is represented by the function
u of Step 1.
Proof of the Step Fix Q 2 Q. Note that %Q and %Q, restricted to X, satisfy weak order,
continuity and risk independence. By Herstein and Milnor (1953) and since %Q is non-
trivial, there exist a nonconstant a¢ ne function vQ which represents %Q. By Step 1, %Q is
represented by u. Since

%Q;%Q

jointly satisfy consistency, it follows that for each x; y 2 X
u (x)  u (y) =) vQ (x)  vQ (y)
By Ghirardato et al. (2004), vQ and u are equal up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation.
So we can set vQ = u, proving the statement. 
Step 7. For each Q 2 Q we have that
f %Q g () min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

(44)
Moreover, the function cQ : ! [0;1], dened by cQ (p) = minq2Q c (p; q) for all p 2 , is
well dened, grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex.
Proof of the Step Fix Q 2 Q. By Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) and since %Q is a rational
preference relation, there exists a normalized, monotone and continuous functional IQ :
B0 ()! R such that
f %Q g () IQ (u (f))  IQ (u (g)) (45)
We next show that IQ (')  infq2Q Iq (') for all ' 2 B0 (). Consider ' 2 B0 (). Since each
Iq is normalized and monotone and u is onto, we have that Iq (') 2 [infs2S ' (s) ; sups2S ' (s)] 
Imu for all q 2 Q. Since ' 2 B0 (), it follows that there exists f 2 F such that ' = u (f)
and x 2 X such that u (x) = infq2Q Iq ('). For each " > 0 there exists x" 2 X such that
u (x") = u (x) + ". Since infq2Q Iq (') = u (x), it follows that for each " > 0 there exists
q 2 Q such that Iq (u (f)) = Iq (') < u (x") = Iq (u (x")), yielding that f 6%Q x". Since
%Q;%Q

jointly satisfy caution, we have that x" %Q f for all " > 0. By (45), this implies
that
u (x) + " = u (x") = IQ (u (x"))  IQ (u (f)) = IQ (') 8" > 0
that is, infq2Q Iq (') = u (x)  IQ ('). We next prove that IQ (')  infq2Q Iq (') for all
' 2 B0 (). Consider ' 2 B0 (). We use the same objects of before. Note that for each
q0 2 Q
Iq0 (u (f)) = Iq0 (')  inf
q2Q
Iq (') = u (x) = Iq0 (u (x))
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that is, f %Q x. Since

%Q;%Q

jointly satisfy consistency, we have that f %Q x. By (45),
this implies that
IQ (') = IQ (u (f))  IQ (u (x)) = u (x) = inf
q2Q
Iq (')
proving that IQ = infq2Q Iq. By (43) and since c is jointly lower semicontinuous and convex,
we can conclude that
IQ (') = inf
q2Q
min
p2
Z
'dp+ c (p; q)

= min
q2Q
min
p2
Z
'dp+ c (p; q)

= min
p2
min
q2Q
Z
'dp+ c (p; q)

= min
p2
Z
'dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

8' 2 B0 ()
By (45), this implies that (44) holds. Finally, by Lemma 4, we have that the function
p 7! minq2Q c (p; q) is well dened, grounded, lower semicontinuous and convex. 
Step 8. c 1Q (0) = Q for all Q 2 Q. Moreover, c (p; q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
Proof of the Step Fix Q 2 Q. Since %Q is subjectively Q-coherent, it follows that c 1Q (0) = Q.
In particular, when Q = fqg for some q 2 , we have that c (p; q) = 0 if and only if
cQ (p) = 0 if and only if p 2 Q if and only if p = q. 
Step 9. dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and for all Q 2 Q.
Proof of the Step By the previous part of the proof, we have that %q coincides with %q on
F for all q 2 . By Lemma 15 and since %q is objectively fqg-coherent, we can conclude
that dom c (; q)  (q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and for all Q 2 Q. 
Steps 4, 7, 8 and 9 prove that c is a statistical distance which is jointly lower semicon-
tinuous and convex such that dom c (; q)  (Q) for all q 2 Q and for all Q 2 Q, yielding
that dom cQ  (Q) for all Q 2 Q. Steps 5 and 7 prove, respectively, (26) and (27). As for
uniqueness, assume that the function ~c :   ! [0;1] is a statistical distance which is
jointly lower semicontinuous and convex and such that dom cQ  (Q) for all Q 2 Q and
that satises (26) and (27). By Proposition 6 of Maccheroni et al. (2006), it follows that
~c (; q) = c (; q) for all q 2 , yielding that c = ~c. 
A.4 Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 2 First, note that minq2QR (pjjq) = 0 if and only if p 2 Q. Indeed,
we have that
min
q2Q
R (pjjq) = 0 () 9q 2 Q s.t. R (pjjq) = 0 () 9q 2 Q s.t. p = q
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Dene n = n for all n 2 N. For each n 2 N, we have nminq2QR (pjjq) = 0 if and only if
p 2 Q. So, for each p 2 ,
lim
n
nmin
q2Q
R (pjjq) =
(
0 if p 2 Q
1 if p 62 Q
Since nminq2QR (pjjq) = 0 for each n 2 N if and only if p 2 Q, by Proposition 12 of
Maccheroni et al. (2006) we have
lim
n
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ nmin
q2Q
R (pjjq)

= min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq 8f 2 F
Finally, by (19), we have that for each f 2 F
min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq  lim
n
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ nmin
q2Q
R (pjjq)

 lim
"1
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q
R (pjjq)

 min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq
yielding the statement. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Note that c (; q) = D (jjq) is Shur convex (with respect to q)
for all q 2 Q. Consider A;B 2 . Assume that q (A)  q (B) for all q 2 Q. Let q 2 Q.
Consider x; y 2 X such that x  y. It follows thatZ
v (u (xAy)) dq 
Z
v (u (xBy)) dq
for each v : R ! R strictly increasing and concave. By Theorem 2 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2012) and since q was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that
min
p2
Z
u (xAy) dp+ D (pjjq)

 min
p2
Z
u (xBy) dp+ D (pjjq)

8q 2 Q
yielding that xAy % xBy and, in particular, xAy % xBy. 
Proof of Proposition 4 We prove the only if, the converse being obvious. Dene & by
f & g if and only if
R
u (f) dq  R u (g) dq for all q 2 Q. By hypothesis, the pair (&;%)
satises consistency. Let f 6& x. Then, there exists q 2 Q such that u(xqf ) =
R
u (f) dq <
u (x). Hence, x  xqf . Since c 1Q (0) = Q, by Lemma 14 we have x  f . So, the pair (&;%)
satises default to certainty. By Theorem 4 of Gilboa et al. (2010), this pair admits the
representation
f & g ()
Z
u (f) dq 
Z
u (g) dq 8q 2 Q
and
f % g () min
q2Q
Z
u (f) dq  min
q2Q
Z
u (g) dq
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Note that, in the notation of Gilboa et al. (2010), we have C = Q because C is unique up
to closure and convexity and Q is closed and convex. 
Proof of Proposition 5 For each q 2 Q dene Iq : B0 ()! R by
Iq (') = min
p2
Z
u (') dp+ c (p; q)

Recall that f  g if and only if for each h; l 2 F there exists " > 0 such that
(1  ) f + h  (1  ) g + l 8 2 [0; "] (46)
Moreover, given f; g 2 F , dene k = infs2S u (f (s)) and k = sups2S u (g (s)).
Only if.Assume that f  g. Let "^ > 0. Consider u (x) = k   "^ and u (y) = k + "^.
By denition, there exists " > 0 such that
(1  ) f + x  (1  ) g + y 8 2 [0; "]
Note that for each q 2 Q and for each  2 [0; 1]
Iq (u ((1  ) f + x)) = Iq ((1  )u (f) + u (x)) = Iq (u (f)  u (f) + u (x))
 Iq (u (f)  k +  (k   "^)) = Iq (u (f))  "^
and
Iq (u ((1  ) g + y)) = Iq ((1  )u (g) + u (y)) = Iq (u (g)  u (g) + u (y))
 Iq (u (g)  k +  (k + "^)) = Iq (u (g)) + "^
It follows that for each q 2 Q and for each  2 [0; "]
Iq (u (f))  Iq (u (g))  2"^  Iq (u ((1  ) f + x))  Iq (u ((1  ) g + y))  0
If we set  = " > 0, then Iq (u (f))  Iq (u (g)) + 2""^, proving the statement.
If. Let f; g 2 F . Assume there exists " > 0 such that Iq (u (f))  Iq (u (g)) + " for
all q 2 Q. Without loss of generality, we can assume that  holds with strict inequality.30
Consider h; l 2 F . Dene k? = infs2S u (h (s)) and k? = sups2S u (l (s)). Dene also k =
sups2S u (f (s)) and k = infs2S u (g (s)). Note that for each q 2 Q and for each  2 [0; 1]
Iq (u ((1  ) f + h)) = Iq ((1  )u (f) + u (h)) = Iq (u (f)  u (f) + u (h))
= Iq (u (f) +  (u (h)  u (f)))
 Iq (u (f) +  (k?   k)) = Iq (u (f)) +  (k?   k)
30 It is enough to replace " with "=2.
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and
Iq (u ((1  ) g + l)) = Iq ((1  )u (g) + u (l)) = Iq (u (g)  u (g) + u (l))
= Iq (u (g) +  (u (l)  u (g)))
 Iq (u (g) +  (k?   k)) = Iq (u (g)) +  (k?   k)
It follows that for each q 2 Q and for each  2 [0; 1]
Iq (u ((1  ) f + h))  Iq (u ((1  ) g + l))  Iq (u (f)) +  (k?   k)  Iq (u (g))   (k?   k)
 "+ "^
where "^ = k?   k   k? + k. We have two cases:
1. "^  0. In this case, Iq (u ((1  ) f + h))   Iq (u ((1  ) g + l)) > 0 for all  2 [0; 1]
and all q 2 Q, proving (46).
2. "^ < 0. In this case, Iq (u ((1  ) f + h))   Iq (u ((1  ) g + l)) > 0 for all  2
[0; "=2"^] and all q 2 Q, proving (46).
This completes the proof of the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3 Given q 2 Q, if c (p; q) = 1 for all p =2 Q, then cQ (p) = 1 for all
p =2 Q. Since cQ (q) = 0 for all q 2 Q, we conclude that cQ (p) = Q (p) for all p 2 .
Conversely, for each q 2 Q we have c (p; q)  cQ (p) = Q (p) =1 for all p =2 Q. 
Proof of Proposition 6 (i) implies (ii). By Proposition 2 of Cerreia-Vioglio (2016) and
since % is unbounded, there exists a compact and convex set C   and an a¢ ne and onto
map u : X ! R such that
f % g ()
Z
u (f) dq 
Z
u (g) dq 8q 2 C (47)
and
f % g () min
q2C
Z
u (f) dq  min
q2C
Z
u (g) dq (48)
By Lemma 14 and since % is subjectively Q-coherent and % and % coincide on X, we
can conclude that C = Q. If we set c :   Q ! [0;1] to be c (p; q) = fqg (p) for all
(p; q) 2 Q, then it is immediate to see that c is a statistical distance. By (47) and (48)
and since C = Q, (13) and (14) follow.
(ii) implies (i). It is trivial. 
Proof of Proposition 7 (i) Let f^ 2 F be optimal. By (23), if there is g 2 F such that
g Q f^ , then g Q f^ , a contradiction with f^ being optimal. We conclude that f^ is weakly
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admissible. A similar argument proves that there is no g 2 F such that g Q f^ when (24)
holds.
(ii) Suppose f^ 2 F is the unique optimal act, that is, f^ Q f for all f^ 6= f 2 F . If g 2 F
is such that g Q f^ , then g %Q f^ . In turn, this implies g %Q f^ Q g, a contradiction. We
conclude that f^ is admissible. 
Proof of Proposition 8 By Lemma 1, c restricted to Q (resp., Q0) is a statistical
distance function. Since Q  Q0, it follows that minq2Q c (p; q)  minq2Q0 c (p; q) for all
p 2 . We thus have
min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u (f) dp+ min
q2Q0
c (p; q)

8f 2 F
yielding that v (Q)  v (Q0). Next, x Q and assume that the sup in (29) is achieved. Let
f 2 F be such that
min
p2
Z
u
 
f

dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

= v (Q)
By contradiction, assume that f 2 F=F Q. By Proposition 5 and since f 62 F Q and f 2 F ,
there exists g 2 F such that g Q f , that is, there exists " > 0 such that
min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

 min
p2
Z
u
 
f

dp+ c (p; q)

+ " 8q 2 Q
This implies that
v (Q)  min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

= min
p2
min
q2Q
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

 inf
q2Q
min
p2
Z
u (g) dp+ c (p; q)

 inf
q2Q
min
p2
Z
u
 
f

dp+ c (p; q)

+ "
 min
p2
min
q2Q
Z
u
 
f

dp+ c (p; q)

+ " = min
p2
Z
u
 
f

dp+min
q2Q
c (p; q)

+ "
= v (Q) + "
a contradiction. 
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